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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON EXTERNAL FORCES IN CAPITAL MARKETS
In the first chapter, I find counties more likely to be affected by climate change
pay more in underwriting fees and initial yields to issue long-term municipal bonds
compared to counties unlikely to be affected by climate change. This difference
disappears when comparing short-term municipal bonds, implying the market prices
climate change risks for long-term securities only. Higher issuance costs for climate
risk counties are driven by bonds with lower credit ratings. Investor attention is a
driving factor, as the difference in issuance costs on bonds issued by climate and
non-climate affected counties increases after the release of the 2006 Stern Review on
climate change. In the second chapter, I document the investment value of alternative
data and examine how market participants react to the data’s dissemination. Using
satellite images of parking lots of US retailers, I find a long-short trading strategy
based on growth in car count earns an alpha of 1.6% per month. I then show that,
after the release of satellite data, hedge fund trades are more sensitive to growth in
car count and are more profitable in affected stocks. Conversely, individual investor
demand becomes less sensitive to growth in car count and less profitable in affected
stocks. Further, the increase in information asymmetry between investors due to the
availability of alternative data leads to a decrease in the liquidity of affected firms.
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Chapter 1 An inconvenient cost: the effects of climate change on
municipal bonds
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I examine whether the municipal bond market prices climate change
risk. The potential financial losses posed by climate change have caused growing con-
cern among investors, with climate change being a top shareholder proposal issue in
recent years.1 For example, in Berkshire Hathaway’s 2015 annual letter to sharehold-
ers, CEO Warren Buffett responded to a proxy proposal that would require Berkshire
to provide an annual report on how their insurance operations are responding to the
threats of climate change:
“The sponsor [of the proxy] may worry that property losses will skyrocket because
of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or
twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for
one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities
of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.”
While insurance companies are able to adjust to increased risks by annually repric-
ing policies, other investments cannot be as responsive to avoid potential climate
change costs. In particular, municipalities in areas that are expected to be greatly
affected by sea level rise would not be able to avoid the costs associated with repair-
ing damaged infrastructure. This leads to an important question: do investors price
climate change risk when this risk cannot be easily addressed?
The municipal bond market provides a useful setting to study this question, as
municipalities are unable to relocate away from climate change risk in the way a
corporation could. For example, if the Folgers Coffee Company felt its New Orleans
factory was at risk of being damaged by sea level rise, they could relocate the fac-
tory to a location with less climate change risk and face little financial consequence.
Orleans Parish, however, cannot relocate its infrastructure and thus cannot reduce
climate change risk as easily. Therefore, investors are more likely to account for cli-
mate change risk when investing in municipal bonds as opposed to corporate bonds
or stocks.
Furthermore, municipal bonds are heterogeneous in term structure. This feature
leads to different expected climate change risk for bonds with different maturities.
Because climate induced sea level rise is likely to cause more damage in two decades
compared to two years, municipal bonds with longer maturities are more likely to
be affected by climate change. If investors are concerned about climate risk, then
municipalities more likely to be affected by climate change (climate bonds) should
face higher issuance costs for long-term bonds compared to municipalities less likely to
be affected (nonclimate bonds). However, investors are unlikely to require a premium
for short-term bonds issued by counties with higher climate risk.
1“Climate change in the 2018 US AGM season: still hot” ISS-Ethix. 2018.
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To address the question of how climate change risk affects municipalities, I exam-
ine whether the cost of issuing municipal bonds is affected by the exposure a county
has to climate change as measured by expected mean annual loss from sea level rise
as a percentage of GDP. This measure of climate risk comes from Hallegatte, Green,
Nicholls, and Corfee-Morlot (2013), who predict global losses to coastal cities based
on a 40cm rise in sea level. I measure the annualized cost of issuing municipal bonds
as the sum of the initial bond yield and the annualized gross spread.
I find that, on average, a one percent increase in climate risk for a county is associ-
ated with a statistically significant increase in annualized issuance costs of 23.4 basis
points for long-term maturity bonds. This additional issuance cost is economically
significant, as a one percent increase in climate risk is associated with an average rise
in total annualized issuance costs of $1.7 million for the average county. However,
when looking at short-term maturity bonds, I find no significant difference in issuance
costs between climate and nonclimate bonds. The difference in issuance costs based
on term structure is robust to a variety of specifications for defining long-term and
short-term bonds. Moreover, placebo tests show no relation between climate risk and
long-term bond issuance costs for neighboring noncoastal counties. Together, these
findings suggest that investors are able to identify investments with a higher risk of
being affected by climate change and that the market prices this risk.
I next examine heterogeneity in the credit ratings of municipalities. Bond rating
agency Moody’s recently issued a report warning coastal counties that if they are
unprepared to deal with climate change damage, they will face credit downgrades.2
The report states that Moody’s expects lower rated counties to be more susceptible
to climate change risks, as they generally have weaker infrastructure and smaller
fiscal capacity. Bond ratings affect the prices of municipal bonds, as investors rely on
them to assess credit risk (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen, 2017). Additionally,
ratings have important effects on local economies. Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira
(2017) find that local government expenditures and employment are positively related
to bond ratings. If investors already price sea level rise risk into their municipal bond
investments (especially for poorly rated bonds), then Moody’s downgrades could
create an unnecessary burden for climate affected counties.
My results show that investors recognize that poorly rated bonds are more sus-
ceptible to climate change risk, as the significant difference in issuance costs between
climate and nonclimate bonds is driven by bonds with lower credit ratings (i.e., below
a Standard & Poor’s rating of AA- or a Moody’s rating of Aa3). This result suggests
the market is able to price climate change risk with regard to credit quality, raising
the question as to whether the potential Moody’s downgrades based on climate risk
are necessary.
To further identify whether investors are taking climate change risks into account,
I conduct a quasi-natural experiment comparing issuance costs before and after a
significant event related to climate change that affects whether investors pay attention
to this risk. In the experiment, I examine the release of Nicholas Stern’s “Economics
of climate change” Review (Stern, 2008), a widely discussed report released in 2006
2“Moody’s warns cities to address climate risks or face downgrades” Bloomberg. November 2017.
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that emphasizes the potential irreversible damages climate change may cause if it is
not addressed. Before the release of the Stern Review, I find no significant difference in
the total annualized cost of issuance between climate and nonclimate bonds. However,
after the release of the Stern Review, the difference in total annualized cost of issuing
long-term climate bonds versus long-term nonclimate bonds increases significantly.
Short-term bond issuance costs are unaffected by the release of the Stern Review.
These results suggest that investors became more aware of climate change risks after
the release of the Stern Review and began pricing these risks into their investments.
Little is known about how long-term climate change risk is priced in financial
markets. Hong, Li, and Xu (2017) focus on climate change induced drought and find
that markets underreact to this risk. However, Bansal, Kiku, and Ochoa (2016) find
that climate change risk as proxied by temperature rise has a negative impact on asset
valuations, implying markets do price climate change risk. In the real estate market,
Bernstein, Gustafson, and Lewis (2017) find that homes exposed to sea level rise sell
at a discount relative to otherwise similar unexposed homes. My findings contribute
to the evidence that the market does react to climate change risks. Further, my re-
sults suggest that investor attention is an important factor regarding whether climate
change risk is priced, as municipal bond investors do not start pricing climate risk
until after the release of the Stern Review. Notably, the debate over the existence of
climate change is irrelevant to my findings. Rather, the results suggest that investors
require a premium for the increased uncertainty as to whether they will see a return
of capital from investments in municipalities with climate risk, regardless of whether
the risk is actually realized.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the financial conse-
quences of climate change. Financial consequences of climate change come in four
general forms: production risk, reputation risk, regulatory/litigation risk, and phys-
ical risk. Hong et al. (2017) show that production risk from prolonged droughts
forecasts a negative effect on the stock returns of firms in the food industry. Dell,
Jones, and Olken (2012) find that higher temperatures can reduce agricultural and
industrial output. Chava (2014) shows that investors require a higher cost of capital
for firms excluded by environmental screens. These firms either face the reputation
risk of being labeled contributors to climate change or face regulatory risk because
current output could be negatively affected by future climate change related regula-
tion. Bernstein et al. (2017) show that the physical risk of sea level rise negatively
affects the price of exposed homes. However, they find little evidence that prices are
affected by sea level rise when the housing market is particularly liquid. My findings
add to this literature by showing that investors are concerned about the physical
risk of climate change on assets traded in a liquid market and that these investors
subsequently price in this risk on the assets they hold.
Finally, this paper adds to the literature on the determinants of municipal bond is-
suance costs. Relevant factors for issuance costs include market transparency (Schultz,
2012), the location of the bond underwriter (Butler, 2008), credit rating (Cornaggia
et al., 2017), and local government policy (Gao, Lee, and Murphy, 2017). To my
knowledge, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence of the effects of cli-
mate change on bond markets and local government financing.
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1.2 Municipal bonds and issuance costs
Municipal bonds are debt issued by state or local governments, typically for the pur-
pose of funding public projects like roads, buildings, utilities, or other infrastructure.
This debt is then paid back by the municipality using either tax revenue (i.e., gen-
eral obligation bonds) or other sources of revenue that come from the project (i.e.,
revenue bonds). For example, a bond issued to fund the building of a parking garage
could then be paid back using the revenue from selling parking passes to the garage.
General obligation bonds are seen as less risky because municipalities are able to raise
taxes in the event that there is not enough funds to pay all debtholders.
When municipalities issue debt, they employ underwriters to structure the deal
and to sell the bonds to investors. Underwriters are compensated by what is referred
to as the gross spread. The gross spread is the difference in price between what the
underwriters pay to buy the bonds from the municipality and what they earn when
they sell the bonds to the market, assuming the bonds are sold at issue price. If the
bonds are sold at a higher price than the issue price, the underwriter’s total profit
increases, and vice versa. A higher gross spread indicates higher search costs for the
underwriter to complete the issuance.
Gross spread is a common proxy for the demand for debt in finance literature.
Dougal, Gao, Mayew, and Parsons (2018) use gross spreads to determine the difference
in demand for bonds issued by historically black colleges and nonhistorically black
colleges. Butler (2008) uses gross spreads to show that local investment banks are
better suited to issue high-risk and nonrated bonds.
Once the municipality and underwriter agree on a gross spread, the underwriter
then issues the bonds to the market at the highest price (lowest yield) they can while
still selling the entire bond issue. Therefore, the yield at issuance of a bond also
informs us as to how much demand a particular bond issue is receiving. I measure
the total annualized cost to issue a bond as the annualized gross spread of a bond plus
the bond yield. It is necessary to annualize gross spread into equivalent payments
over the life of a bond because gross spread is a one-time payment, whereas yield is
an annual cost. I annualize gross spread by taking the geometric average of gross
spread scaled by the bond’s maximum maturity at issuance.
If investors see climate change as a potential risk of investment, then underwriters
would have higher search costs when marketing a bond issuance, and investors would
require a higher yield to compensate for the additional risk. This leads to the main
hypothesis of the paper: municipal bonds with higher exposure to climate change
risk will have higher issuance costs, on average.
1.3 County rankings on climate change exposure
This paper focuses on climate change risk stemming from climate-induced sea level
rise. Though there are several forms of climate change risk (e.g., extreme precipi-
tation, extreme drought, and urban heat islands), sea level rise is one of the most
significant risks and the risk most studied by climatologists. The main variable I use
to measure climate change risk, the mean annual loss as a percentage of GDP, comes
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from a study by Hallegatte et al. (2013) that predicts global losses based on a 40cm
rise in sea level and assuming cities attempt to adapt to the rise in sea level (e.g.,
upgrading dikes and sea walls). The following discussion of their specific methodology
paraphrases some of the information from the supplemental file to Hallegatte et al.
(2013).
Hallegatte et al. (2013) first use elevation-based geographical information systems
to compute population exposure in each 50 cm “elevation layer” from the current
mean sea level. They then translate the exposed population into exposed assets
using estimates of the amount of capital per inhabitant. For current defense levels in
coastal cities, the authors follow the methodology of Linham, Green, and Nichollas.3
When assessing flood losses, Hallegatte et al. (2013) assume that when the water
level is below the defense level for a city, the failure probability is zero, even if the
water level is higher than the sea level of the city. To translate exposed assets as
a function of water level into asset losses, each elevation layer is assigned one of six
categories: (1) lightweight timber-framed dwellings; (2) masonry dwellings; (3) low-
income country dwellings; (4) dwelling contents; (5) nonresidential structures; and
(6) nonresidential content. Mean annual flood losses are then estimated using the
probability of flood losses at each water level. The authors assume climate-induced
sea level rise is homogeneous and that storm surge likelihood will not change due
to sea level rise. The study also considers several other drivers of floods, including
demographic and socioeconomic changes and human-induced subsidence.
Table 1.1 presents each US city included in Hallegatte et al. (2013), ranked by
climate risk. As municipal bonds are issued at the county level, I match the ranked
cities with their associated counties. Table 1.1 shows that most climate change risk
is concentrated in a few counties. The city with the highest climate risk is New
Orleans, LA, which is expected to have a mean annual loss to GDP of 1.48% due
to sea level rise. Notably, low climate risk in percentage terms can still mean large
potential losses in dollar terms. For example, although New York/Newark’s climate
risk is only 0.09%, they are still expected to have annual losses of over $2.1 billion.
A shortcoming of using the estimates of the Hallegatte et al. (2013) study is that
I am only able to observe climate risk estimates for major coastal cities. Fortunately,
the affected counties still account for a significant 15% of the total number of issuances
in my sample. However, potential biases may still occur. First, it is possible to
find spurious results due to the relatively small number of counties. I address this
possibility by conducting placebo tests for affected counties in Section 1.5.2. Second,
I assume coastal counties not measured in Hallegatte et al. (2013) have a climate risk
of zero, even though these counties will likely be negatively affected by sea level rise.
This assumption is not a major concern, as it biases against finding a significant result.
Nevertheless, I ensure that my results are robust to the exclusion of all unobserved
coastal counties.
3“Costs of adaptation to the effects of climate change in the world’s large port cities” Work stream
2, report 14 of the AVOID programme. 2010.
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1.4 Data
I obtain data on municipal bond offerings from Bloomberg. The data for new issues
is restricted to bonds with issue sizes above one million dollars and that are rated
by either Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s. Additionally, I exclude bonds for which
both the gross spread and initial yield are unavailable.4 The final sample contains
327,152 municipal issues, 50,914 of which are issued in counties with a climate risk
above zero.
Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the bond data separated by climate
and nonclimate bonds. The bond issues range from January 2004 to March 2017. In
a univariate setting, climate counties, on average, pay 6 basis points less in gross
spread and 11 basis points more in initial yield. Bonds issued by climate counties, on
average, pay 3.03% in total annualized costs to issue a bond, compared to 2.95% for
nonclimate counties. For climate (nonclimate) bonds, the average issue size is $13.4
($8) million, and the average maximum maturity is 14.63 (13.57) years. Over half of
the bonds (61% and 60%) in the sample have a call provision, 15% (16%) are insured,
18% (19%) have a sinking provision, 40% (49%) are general obligation bonds, and
6% (7%) are pre-refunded. The majority of the bonds are tax exempt, 85% (81%)
federally exempt, and 77% (75%) state exempt. Bonds subject to the alternative
minimum tax (AMT) make up 4% (3%) of the sample. AMT’s tend to have higher
yields that reflects the risk that they could become taxable to some investors in
the future, based on changing income levels. The average underwriter issued 16,820
(14,530) bonds during the sample period.
Following Cantor and Packer (1997), I convert Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s
rating scales into numeric form. The highest rated bonds (AAA or Aaa) are given
a value of one, bonds with ratings of AA+ or Aa1 are given a value of two, and
so forth. Therefore, the median sample rating of three indicates that the median
rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s (Moody’s) is AA (Aa2). In the case where
both credit agencies rate a bond, I use Standard & Poor’s rating. This is because,
in the past, Moody’s was more likely to assign unsolicited ratings that are likely to
have a downward bias.5
Municipalities may choose underwriters through either negotiated or competitive
offerings. A negotiated offering occurs when the issuer and an underwriter come to
a contractual agreement that the underwriter will have exclusive rights to distribute
the issue. In a competitive offering, multiple underwriters bid for the rights to issue
the bond, with the winning bid being the one with the lowest issuance cost to the
municipality. Controlling for the type of underwriting procedure is important, as the
type of offering is an important factor in the cost of the issue. Competitive offerings
4Bloomberg denotes the gross spread as the issuance discount spread and gives the following defini-
tion: “Security issuance underwriter discount costs (including spreads, takedown, and underwriting
fees disclosed by the underwriter in official documents accompanying the sale) expressed as a per-
centage of the total issued amount.”
5Unsolicited ratings are ratings assigned by an agency that were not requested by an issuer (i.e., the
issuer does not pay the rating agency to assign a rating). Unsolicited ratings have been criticized as
a form of extortion, as agencies assign lower ratings when they are not hired by the issuer (Butler
and Cornaggia, 2012).
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tend to be less costly for the municipality when there are many bids, but negotiated
offerings can be cheaper if there are few underwriter bids (Kidwell and Sorensen,
1983). The new issuance sample consists of 23% (28%) competitive and 77% (72%)
negotiated offerings.
Municipalities often employ underwriters to issue multiple bonds in one package.
Bonds included in a package tend to have a similar purpose (i.e., each bond is issued to
fund the same project) but will differ in characteristics like maturity. Each maturity
is assigned a separate CUSIP that is used as an identifier for trading on the secondary
market. The mean (median) packaged issue for climate bonds has 12.77 (10) CUSIPs,
while the mean (median) packaged issue for nonclimate bonds has 10.81 (9) CUSIPs.
Panel B of Table 1.2 details the total annualized issuance cost, yield, gross spread,
and percentage of climate bonds broken down by maximum maturity and rating. The
main identification strategy I use to identify long-term versus short-term bonds is
whether or not the bond’s maximum possible maturity is above or below 25 years.
Bonds with a maximum maturity of 25 years or greater at issuance make up nearly
10% of the sample. Assuming investors are rational, I expect to see higher issuance
costs for long-term climate bonds compared to long-term nonclimate bonds but no
significant difference between short-term bonds. Climate change studies differ in their
forecasts for when sea level rise will significantly damage coastal areas, ranging from
as early as 2030 until past 2100 (Tol, 2009). To ensure that my results are not unique
to the 25 year sample split, I confirm that my results are robust to a variety of term
structure cutoffs in Section 1.5.2. The average total annualized cost is 4.66% for
bonds with a maturity of 25 years or more and 2.82% for bonds with a maturity of
less than 25 years.
Although there are relatively few counties with an observed climate risk, they
represent a significant portion of the sample. This is likely because counties with
an identified climate risk are among the largest in the country and therefore need to
issue proportionally more bonds to fund their operations. The percentage of climate
bonds in each subcategory (12.5% to 19.8%) is consistently close to the percentage
of climate bonds in the total sample (15.1%). As expected, the last four rows of
Panel B show that total annualized issuance cost, yield, and gross spread all increase
monotonically as ratings decline.
1.5 The effect of sea level rise on municipal bond issuance costs
To examine the effects of an increase in climate risk on the cost to issue a municipal
bond, I estimate the following model:
Total annualized issuance cost = β1 ∗ Climate risk + β2 ∗Bond controls +
β3 ∗ State× Y ear FE + ε.
(1.1)
Following the municipal bond literature, I include controls for the log of the issue
size, the log of the maximum maturity, the bond’s initial credit rating, the log of the
number of CUSIPS packaged in the same issue, the log of the number of underwriter
deals that the bond’s underwriter has issued in the sample, and indicator variables
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for whether the bond is callable, insured, sinkable, pre-refunded, funded by general
obligation, competitively issued, federally tax-exempt, state tax-exempt, or subject
to AMT. I also include state-year fixed effects. The fixed effects control for the
possibility that climate affected counties tend to issue bonds when issuance costs
are relatively high as well as the possibility that the climate risk measure captures
unobserved cross-state factors. All standard errors are clustered by the county of
issuance, as the residuals of the regressions could be correlated within counties.
1.5.1 Main results
Table 1.3 presents the results for the effect of climate risk on issuance costs. Panel
A compares results for total annualized issuance costs for long-term and short-term
bonds, based on whether their maximum maturity is greater than or less than 25
years. The first three columns show that long-term bonds are more costly to issue
when there is an increased risk of sea level rise for a county. Column 1 shows the
relation between climate risk and total issuance cost when controlling for three pri-
mary determinants of issuance costs: the size, maturity, and credit rating of the bond.
Under this specification, a one percent increase in climate risk is associated with a
33.3 basis point increase in the total annualized issuance cost of a bond, significant at
the 1% level. Given the unconditional average cost of a long-term issuance is 4.66%,
this represents a 7.1% increase from the mean annualized issuance cost. Similar to
other findings in the municipal bond offering literature, I find that issuance costs are
higher for bond issuances of smaller size, longer maturity, and a worse credit rating.6
In column 2, I add the rest of the controls for bond issuance characteristics that
can affect issuance costs. Climate risk remains a significant factor for issuance costs,
as a one percent increase in climate risk is associated with a 23.4 basis point increase
in total annualized cost. This represents a 5.0% increase from the mean annualized
issuance cost. In economic terms, a one percent increase in climate risk would increase
the total annualized cost of issuing a long-term bond of average size ($27.5 million) by
$64,350. The average county issues 26.32 long-term bonds during the sample period,
bringing the total burden of a one percent increase in climate risk to an additional
$1,693,692 in annualized issuance costs for the average municipality.
The final three columns of Table 1.3, Panel A present results for short-term bond
issuances. The magnitude for climate risk is reduced to between 7.7 and 9.3 basis
points and is insignificant in all specifications. This loss of significance is particularly
striking when considering that the sample of short-term bonds is nearly 12 times
larger than the sample for long-term bonds.
Panels B and C of Table 1.3 break down total annualized issuance cost into its
components of initial yield and gross spread. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B show that
investors require between a 16 and 20 basis point higher yield to invest in a long-term
bond with a one percent higher climate risk. For short-term bonds, the magnitude on
climate risk is reduced to between 7 and 7.9 basis points and is insignificant in both
6Recall that rating was converted to a numeric scale. Therefore, a higher numeric rating represents
a lower credit rating. In unreported tests, I substitute the rating control with rating fixed effects
and find qualitatively similar results.
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specifications. Panel C shows that underwriters also require a higher compensation
to issue municipal bonds with climate risk. A one percent increase in climate risk is
associated with between a 10.8 and 15.1 basis point increase in gross spread for long-
term bonds. Climate risk once again does not appear to be a factor for short-term
bonds, with an insignificant coefficient between -0.4 and 1.9 basis points.7
One possible concern when interpreting the climate risk coefficient is the possi-
bility that a few counties with relatively high climate risk are driving the results. I
address this concern in two ways. First, I log-transform climate risk to reduce the
influence of outlying counties. Under this specification, the coefficient on climate risk
remains significant at the 5% level, with a magnitude of 0.339. I use the log of climate
risk in all subsequent tests to ensure that outliers in terms of climate risk are not
driving the results. Second, because New Orleans is an outlier in terms of climate
risk, I drop all observations of municipal issuances in Orleans Parish and reestimate
the model in Eq. 1.1. The results using the sample with Orleans Parish excluded are
shown in the first two columns in Panel A of Table 1.4. Climate risk (log of climate
risk) is still a significant predictor of annualized issuance costs under this specifica-
tion, with a significant coefficient of 0.379 (0.441). These results imply that the effect
of climate risk on issuance costs is not driven by risk factors specific to New Orleans.
I next examine the relation between climate risk and issuance costs with all “un-
observed” coastal counties omitted. In the main specification, I assume that all cities
that were not measured by Hallegatte et al. (2013) have a climate risk of zero. This
assumption should bias against finding significant results, as these unobserved coastal
counties likely do have risks associated with sea level rise. Indeed, I find a stronger
association between climate risk and annualized issuance costs when unobserved coun-
ties are dropped. Columns 3 and 4 in Panel A of Table 1.4 report the results. I find
a coefficient on climate risk (log of climate risk) of 0.366 (0.414), which is 56% (22%)
higher than the coefficient of 0.234 (0.339) in the main specification. Insignificant
results are once again found for short-term issuances when estimating the model with
Orleans Parish dropped and with unobserved coastal counties dropped. Together, the
evidence in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 suggest investors and underwriters require a premium
to accept climate change risk, and this premium varies based on the magnitude and
time horizon of climate risk.
1.5.2 Robustness analyses
Even after controlling for observables in a multivariate regression, there still exist
potential concerns regarding whether the results in Table 1.3 are precisely identifying
the effect of climate risk on municipal offering costs. One possible concern is that
the choice of the term structure cutoff does not identify what an investor would see
as the cutoff for short-term and long-term bonds. Another possibility is that the
small number of climate risk counties is creating a spurious result and not actually
identifying climate risk. In this section, I attempt to mitigate these concerns.
7In the interest of parsimony, for subsequent tests I report results for the annualized total cost
measure only. Results for the separate analyses of yields and gross spreads can be found in the
appendix.
9
To ensure that investors do take into account the time horizon factor of climate
risk, I conduct several robustness tests in which I vary the definition of long-term
versus short-term bonds. I first test whether the results still hold when long-term
(short-term) bonds are identified as those with a maturity of 20 or more (less than
20) years. I repeat this test using a cutoff of 30 years as well as varying the maximum
maturity date to be 2036, 2041, or 2046. The choice to use a date as the cutoff
in addition to maximum maturity at issuance is to account for the possibility that
investors see climate change risk being more likely after a certain target date that
may have been referenced in the media or a scientific study. The years 2036, 2041,
and 2046 were chosen as they are 20, 25, and 30 years after the final full year of data
in my sample, respectively.
Table 1.5 presents the results for the varying term structure splits. Panel A
shows that, regardless of specification, climate risk is significantly related to the total
annualized issuance cost of long-term municipal bonds. Further, the coefficient on
the log of climate risk monotonically increases with the length of the term structure
cutoff point. For the shortest cutoffs, the 20 year and 2036 splits, the magnitude
on the log of climate risk is 19.8 and 20.5 basis points, respectively. For the longest
cutoffs, the 30 year and 2046 splits, the coefficients for climate risk increase to 65.6
and 154 basis points, respectively. Panel B reports the results for the various short-
term specifications. Consistent with the main results, investors do not require a
premium for climate risk when the bonds mature earlier. Across all specifications,
the coefficient on the log of climate risk is insignificant and smaller in magnitude
compared to its long-term counterpart.8 These results support the argument that
investors require a higher premium for climate change risk when the time horizon of
the investment is longer.
I next address the possibility that the small number of climate risk counties is
creating spurious results by conducting two placebo tests using counties unlikely to
be affected by sea level rise. In the first test, I identify placebo counties geographically,
assigning the climate risk of a county to the closest noncoastal county. The placebo
counties are likely to experience similar economic conditions compared to the climate
affected counties. Therefore, a significant coefficient on climate risk in the placebo
test would suggest the climate risk measure is identifying unobserved local traits
rather than risk due to sea level rise. However, an insignificant coefficient on climate
risk would suggest the measure is accurately identifying climate risk.
In the second test, I identify placebo counties by conducting a nearest neighbor
matching test based on the propensity to be a climate affected county. I match
to the nearest neighbor based on the size of issuances, the number of CUSIPs per
issue, the total number of issues by the county in the sample, and credit rating.
These variables are used to identify counties with similar sized economies and fiscal
capacities. I require all matched counties to be in noncoastal states to reduce any
likelihood that these counties would be affected by sea level rise. I then assign the
climate risk of affected counties to their nearest neighbor matched counties and test
8Results are qualitatively similar for the specifications with New Orleans dropped and with unob-
served coastal counties dropped (see Table A.1).
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the main model specification on the placebo bonds. An insignificant coefficient on
climate risk for this placebo test would suggest that the main results are correctly
identifying the relation between climate risk and issuance costs.
Table 1.6 presents the results of the placebo tests. I include results for all term
structure cutoffs. Panel A presents results for the test using the closest noncoastal
neighbors as placebo counties. The coefficient on the log of climate risk is insignificant
across all specifications, implying that unobserved local conditions are not driving
the main result. Panel B shows results using the nearest neighbor matching placebo
test. Again, the coefficient on the log of climate risk is insignificant in all tests,
implying that the results for the actual climate affected counties are not spurious.
Together, these robustness tests provide evidence that climate risk and term structure
are accurately identified and suggest a causal link between climate risk and municipal
bond issuance costs.
1.5.3 Credit rating split
Moody’s recent report detailing how they will assess the credit impact of climate
change risk mentions varied expectations for how counties with different credit ratings
will adapt to these risks:
“Higher rated sovereigns tend to be less susceptible to climate change risks, since
they generally have more diversified economies, stronger infrastructure and a greater
ability to carry a higher debt burden at more affordable interest rates. In contrast,
sovereigns with a greater reliance on agriculture, lower incomes, weaker infrastructure
quality, and smaller fiscal capacity exhibit greater susceptibility to the physical effects
of climate change.”
The ability to carry a higher debt burden is of particular importance. Though the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will likely assist with some of the
costs of damages due to sea level rise, affected counties will still be expected to pay
for a significant portion of the expenses.9 Additionally, aid from FEMA takes time
to be approved and disbursed, requiring municipalities to cover the costs of repair
until federal assistance arrives. Covering disaster costs will be especially difficult for
municipalities whose finances are already under pressure, as the flooding could lead to
lost tax revenues, either through lost revenue from unusable infrastructure or through
a shrinking population that would erode the taxable base.10 Therefore, counties with
more financial flexibility will be better able to deal with the expected damages of
sea level rise. If investors recognize this heterogeneity in financial flexibility, then
the increase in issuance costs for climate affected municipal bonds should be driven
by counties in poorer financial health. Further, if the market already recognizes
the asymmetric effect of climate risk on lower rated municipal bonds, then Moody’s
potential downgrades may not be necessary.
To test whether the risk premium that investors and underwriters require for
climate change differs based on credit quality, I split the sample based on whether
9After a state of emergency is declared, FEMA provides supplemental assistance for state and local
government recovery costs, with the federal share being at least 75% of eligible expenses.
10“Do hurricanes pose a risk to the muni bond market?” Charles Schwab. September 2017.
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the issuance has a “high grade” or better credit rating. Bonds with a credit rating of
AA- (Aa3 for Moody’s ratings) or higher are considered high grade. High grade rated
bonds make up 27% of long-term issuances and 17% of short-term issuances. Counties
that issue high grade rated bonds are more likely to have stronger infrastructure
and fiscal capacity and therefore should have less climate change risk. Therefore,
a significant coefficient on climate risk for bonds rated below high grade and an
insignificant coefficient for high grade bonds would suggest that the market accounts
for differences in credit quality when assessing climate risk.
The results are shown in Table 1.7. Consistent with the market recognizing the
asymmetric effect of climate risk based on credit, the coefficient on climate risk is
significant only for long-term bonds that are rated below high grade. Column 1
reports that a one percent increase in climate risk is associated with a 52.7 basis
point increase in the annualized costs to issue a long-term municipal bond that is
rated below AA- (Aa3 for Moody’s). In contrast, column 2 reports no significant
relation between climate risk and annualized issuance costs for long-term municipal
bonds that are high grade rated. In columns 3 and 4, I repeat the subsample tests
for short-term bonds. As expected, there is no relation between climate risk and
annualized issuance costs for short-term bonds, regardless of credit rating.
Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings definition states that their rating system “takes
into consideration the creditworthiness of insurers”; therefore, whether or not a bond
is insured is accounted for in the rating split tests. The results are also robust to the
exclusion of uninsured bonds from the sample. Additionally, the significant relation
between climate risk and issuance costs for lower rated bonds is robust to several
different credit rating splits. In unreported tests, I find the coefficient on climate risk
is positive and significant when looking at long-term bonds rated below AAA, AA+,
or AA. Likewise, the climate risk coefficient is insignificant when looking at long-term
bonds rated AAA, AA+ or higher, or AA or higher. These results are relevant to
credit rating agencies deciding how to address climate change risk, as the findings
suggest the market is able to recognize the heterogeneous effects of climate change
due to credit quality.
1.6 Difference-in-differences around the Stern Review
In this section, I examine whether investor attention plays a role in the pricing of
climate change risks. Investor attention has been shown to be a significant factor
for stock price volatility (Andrei and Hasler, 2014), short-term stock returns (Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2011; Lou, 2014), and reactions to earnings announcements
(Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2011), among others. In the context of this paper, I
expect market attention to be a key driver of whether climate risks are priced in the
municipal bond market. To identify market attention on climate change, I conduct a
quasi-natural experiment surrounding the release of the Stern Review, which is likely
to significantly increase the market’s attention toward climate change.
On October 30, 2006, economist Nicholas Stern published a report detailing the
costs of damages that climate change is expected to have on the world economy. The
“Stern Review” is one of the earliest and most thorough analyses of the economics of
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climate change and also one of the most well known. After the release of the Stern
Review, it is likely that investors began paying attention to the risks climate change
poses on their investments.
An increase in attention to climate change after the release of the Stern Review
is evident when examining Google search volume. Fig. 1 plots the quarterly average
search volume for the term “climate change” for 2005 to 2007. Search volume for
climate change spikes following the release of the Stern Review and is higher for all
quarters after the release relative to the quarters before. This rise in search volume
suggests an increased attention toward the risks of climate change after the Stern
Review’s release.
Additionally, Stephen Kass and Jean McCarroll cite the Stern Review when mak-
ing the following prediction about municipal markets:11
“National and municipal governments around the world will be called on not only
to deal with short-term floods and evacuees, but to provide emergency food, water and
health care services, and to undertake agricultural restoration and large-scale urban
reconstruction... Insurance companies, investors and lending institutions will, after
the initial losses, begin to introduce (as some insurers already are) screening standards
designed to identify climate change risks.”
Other references in the press to the Stern Review state the review raised awareness
to climate change for “Wall Street investors, insurance executives, state treasurers
and pension fund managers”12 and increased voter attention toward environmen-
tally conscious politicians.13 The Stern Review is unlikely to change the risk profile
of municipal bonds other than through increased awareness of climate change risk.
Therefore, a significant increase in issuance costs for long-term climate bonds after
the Stern Review would indicate that the measure of climate change is identifying
climate risk and that investor attention is a key determinant of whether the market
prices climate change.
In Table 1.8, I conduct difference-in-differences tests to examine whether increased
investor attention on climate change translates into higher annualized issuance costs
for climate affected bonds. I create an indicator variable equal to zero if the bond
was issued prior to the release of the Stern Review and equal to one after the Stern
Review’s release. The interaction variable Ln(Climate risk) × Stern will give the
marginal effect of the Stern Review on the annualized issuance costs of climate bonds
relative to nonclimate bonds.
The results indicate that the difference in annualized issuance costs between cli-
mate and nonclimate bonds does increase after the release of the Stern Review. Col-
umn 1 of Table 1.8 presents results for the difference-in-differences tests for long-term
bonds. Prior to the release of the Stern Review, there is no significant relation be-
tween climate risk and annualized issuance costs, as the coefficient on climate risk is
an insignificant -15.9 basis points. However, the market begins pricing climate risk
after the release of the Stern Review, with a coefficient on the interaction term of
11“Climate change and environmental practice” New York Law Journal. 2006
12“Wall Street eyes heart of darkness: global warming” Reuters. December 2006.
13“Climate change catching voter attention around world” Reuters. January 2007.
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60.7 basis points, significant at the 5% level.
To isolate the effect of market attention on the pricing of climate risk, I restrict
the sample to bonds issued near the release of the Stern Review. I examine two
time frames around the Stern Review: a two-year window (one year before and after
the Stern Review) and a one-year window (six months before and after the Stern
Review). The narrower time frames help mitigate the possibility of preexisting trends
confounding the results. Looking first at the two-year window in column 2, the
interaction term remains statistically significant with a coefficient of 63.3 basis points.
For the one-year window, the interaction term is reduced to 38.4 basis points and is
statistically insignificant (t-statistic = 1.3). The similar magnitude of the coefficients
for the full sample and the shortened time frames suggests that most of the effect
occurs in the year after the release of the Stern Review.14
In Fig. 2, I further examine how the premium required for climate affected bonds
changes around the Stern Review. The figure shows the difference in annualized
issuance costs based on climate risk for the five quarters before and after the release of
the Stern Review (which was released in the fourth quarter of 2006). The difference in
annualized issuance costs is near zero in the five quarters preceding the Stern Review
and grows considerably after the review is released. This difference continues to grow
for several quarters after the event and is statistically significant by the third quarter
of 2007, suggesting the market gradually incorporated the information provided by
the Stern Review. The change in trends shown in Fig. 2 is consistent with market
attention being a driving factor in whether climate risk is priced.
In the final three columns of Table 1.8, I examine whether the Stern Review had
any impact on short-term bond issuances. The coefficients on the interaction terms
for all specifications are insignificant and greatly reduced compared to the long-term
bonds. For the full sample, the interaction term is an insignificant 0.1 basis points.
The results in Table 1.8 and Fig. 2 suggest that investors began paying more attention
to the risks of climate change after the release of the Stern Review and recognized
that these risks would be concentrated in long-term bond issuances.
1.7 Conclusion
The impact that climate change risk has on the municipal bond market is meaning-
ful. I find that long-term municipal bonds are significantly affected by their level
of exposure to climate change risk, whereas short-term bonds do not appear to be
affected. This finding is robust to numerous term structure specifications. Addition-
ally, the results suggest the market accounts for differences in credit quality when
assessing climate risk. Finally, I find that investors appear to react to climate change
news, showing that climate change is on the forefront of factors influencing investors’
decisions.
14In Table A.6 of the appendix, I confirm that the results of the Stern Review difference-in-differences
tests are robust to the exclusion of bonds issued in New Orleans and bonds issued in unobserved
coastal counties.
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For the purposes of this paper, the debate over the existence of climate change
is irrelevant. Many forms of investment risk go unrealized, yet investors require a
premium for the uncertainty that accompanies those risks. The findings in this paper
suggest that investors account for the increased uncertainty as to whether they will
see a return of capital from municipal bonds issued in counties with higher climate
change risk, regardless of whether those counties will actually be affected by climate
change.
The evidence found in this study has important implications for the counties
most likely to be affected by climate change. Because climate change risk is causing
counties to be negatively affected today through higher debt issuance costs, these
counties should be proactive in reducing the amount of damage that sea level rise is
likely to cause to their municipalities. The findings in this paper provide evidence
that investors are aware of climate change risks to their assets and are taking these
risks into account when investing. The ability of the market to recognize differences
in climate risk based on credit quality is an important factor for whether credit rating
agencies decide to downgrade these municipalities’ bonds.
Though there has been prior research showing that investors account for repu-
tation and regulation risk when investing in companies that contribute to climate
change, this paper is the first to document that investors account for the risk that
climate change poses on fixed income assets in their portfolios. The results of this
paper could potentially motivate counties to take steps toward preparing themselves
for the potential damages of sea level rise, helping them to avoid climate change’s
“inconvenient cost.”
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Table 1.1: Counties with climate change risk
This table ranks cities by their exposure to climate change risk by expected mean annual loss as a percentage of a city’s GDP. The mean
annual loss is the optimistic bound calculated assuming a 40cm rise in sea level and that cities attempt to adapt to the rise in sea level.
Cities and counties that are grouped together are assigned the same climate risk. The estimates in this table are from Hallegatte et al.
(2013). All counties not included in this table are assigned a climate risk of zero.
City County Mean annual loss (MM$) Climate risk
New Orleans, LA Orleans 1940 1.479%
Miami, FL Miami Dade 2964 0.420%
Tampa/St. Petersburg, FL Hillsborough, Pinellas 948 0.324%
Virginia Beach, VA Virginia Beach 328 0.173%
Boston, MA Suffolk 849 0.149%
Baltimore, MD Baltimore 299 0.104%
LA/Long Beach/Santa Ana, CA Los Angeles, Orange 217 0.097%
New York, NY/ Newark,NJ Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, Richmond, Essex 2159 0.089%
Providence, RI Providence 135 0.083%
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia 309 0.044%
San Francisco/Oakland, CA San Francisco, Alameda 185 0.042%
Houston, TX Walker, Montgomery, Liberty, Waller, Austin, 214 0.038%
Harris, Chambers, Colorado, Wharton, Fort Bend,
Galveston, Brazoria, Matagorda
Seattle, WA King 90 0.023%
Washington D.C. Washington 91 0.016%
San Diego, CA San Diego 14 0.004%
Portland, OR Multnomah 4 0.002%
San Jose, CA Santa Clara 2 0.001%
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Table 1.2: New issue municipal bond data
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of bonds acquired from Bloomberg,
covering bonds that were issued from January 2004 through March 2017. All bonds in this
sample have issue sizes of $1MM or greater and are rated by either S&P or Moody’s. Panel
A reports variables including the difference between the price underwriters paid for the
issue and what price they sold the issue to the market (Gross spread, winsorized at 3% and
97%); the yield the bond was issued at (winsorized at 3% and 97%); the total annualized
cost of issuance (annualized gross spread plus yield); the total size of the issue (Issue
size); the bond’s maturity not considering options of the issue (Max maturity); dummy
variables equaling one if the bond is callable, insured, sinkable, GO backed, pre-refunded,
or competitively issued; a numerical scale of credit rating (Rating); and dummy variables
identifying whether the bond is exempt from federal and state taxes. AMT identifies bonds
that are subject to the alternative minimum tax. CUSIPS/Issue reports how many bonds
are packaged in each issue and # of deals an underwriter has issued in the sample. Panel
B breaks down the statistics by the time range the bond was issued and by rating. Each
row presents the mean value for each variable. N denotes the number of observations for
each category that have nonmissing values of total annualized issuance cost.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by climate risk
Climate bonds Nonclimate bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Total annualized cost (%) 40161 3.03 2.93 1.52 210695 2.95 2.85 2.17
Gross spread (%) 41766 0.54 0.49 0.30 217113 0.60 0.53 0.33
Yield (%) 49309 3.02 3.00 1.42 269820 2.91 2.85 1.37
Issue size (MM$) 50914 13.40 4.36 33.40 276238 8.00 2.62 22.20
Max maturity (Years) 50914 14.63 13.98 8.65 276238 13.57 12.54 8.10
Callable 50914 0.61 1.00 0.49 276238 0.60 1.00 0.49
Insurance 50914 0.15 0.00 0.36 276238 0.16 0.00 0.37
Rating 50914 3.25 3.00 1.90 276238 3.22 3.00 1.91
Sinkable 50914 0.18 0.00 0.39 276238 0.19 0.00 0.39
GO 50914 0.40 0.00 0.49 276238 0.49 0.00 0.50
Pre-refunded 50914 0.06 0.00 0.24 276238 0.07 0.00 0.25
Competitive 50914 0.23 0.00 0.42 276238 0.28 0.00 0.45
AMT 50914 0.04 0.00 0.20 276238 0.03 0.00 0.17
Fed exempt 50914 0.85 1.00 0.36 276238 0.81 1.00 0.39
State exempt 50914 0.77 1.00 0.42 276238 0.75 1.00 0.43
CUSIPS/Issue 50914 12.77 10.00 10.38 276238 10.81 9.00 8.83
# Underwriter deals (M) 50914 16.82 17.95 10.75 276238 14.53 15.92 10.62
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics by categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total cost Yield Spread % Climate N
Max maturity ≥ 25 4.66 4.58 0.67 19.78% 19527
Max maturity < 25 2.82 2.77 0.59 15.10% 231280
Rating = 1 2.62 2.63 0.52 14.53% 46544
Rating = 2, 3, or 4 2.92 2.90 0.61 16.45% 155131
Rating = 5, 6, or 7 3.27 3.31 0.62 12.48% 39869
Rating ≥ 8 4.20 4.09 0.91 18.70% 9312
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Table 1.3: Effect of climate risk on municipal bond annualized issuance costs
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of Eq. (1). The variable
of interest is Climate risk, defined in Table 1.1. The long-term sample contains bond
issuances with a maximum maturity of 25 years or more. The short-term sample contains
bond issuances with a maximum maturity of less than 25 years. The dependent variable
in Panel A is the total annualized issuance cost of a municipal bond. In Panel B, the
dependent variable is the initial yield of the bond. Gross spread is the dependent variable
in Panel C. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Total annualized issuance cost for long-term and short-term bonds
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Total annualized cost
Climate risk 0.333*** 0.234* 0.092 0.077
(2.932) (1.854) (1.525) (1.544)
Ln(Climate risk) 0.339** 0.093
(2.085) (1.117)
Ln(Size) -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.008 0.001 0.001
(-7.863) (-7.010) (-7.028) (-1.262) (0.178) (0.176)
Ln(Maturity) 0.813*** 0.818*** 0.818*** 0.951*** 0.667*** 0.667***
(5.666) (6.317) (6.307) (21.872) (8.230) (8.230)
Rating 0.106*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(16.950) (17.215) (17.240) (17.034) (13.848) (13.851)
Callable 0.007 0.008 0.532*** 0.532***
(0.074) (0.078) (6.800) (6.800)
Insurance 0.023 0.023 0.235*** 0.235***
(0.881) (0.880) (12.754) (12.764)
Sinkable 0.056 0.057 0.284*** 0.284***
(0.735) (0.738) (21.369) (21.362)
GO 0.006 0.007 -0.083*** -0.083***
(0.180) (0.194) (-3.800) (-3.799)
Pre-refunded 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.039** 0.039**
(4.500) (4.498) (1.969) (1.971)
Competitive -0.089 -0.089 -0.055*** -0.055***
(-1.467) (-1.465) (-5.380) (-5.368)
Fed exempt -0.476*** -0.476*** -0.313*** -0.313***
(-11.091) (-11.092) (-9.647) (-9.649)
State exempt 0.028 0.027 -0.052* -0.052*
(0.451) (0.431) (-1.746) (-1.746)
AMT -0.248*** -0.248*** 0.071 0.071
(-4.464) (-4.463) (1.568) (1.567)
Ln(CUSIPS/Issue) 0.171*** 0.170*** -0.027* -0.027*
(6.309) (6.291) (-1.954) (-1.953)
Ln(Underwriter deals) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.032) (-0.028) (0.005) (0.009)
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,527 19,527 19,527 231,280 231,280 231,280
R-squared 0.284 0.295 0.295 0.268 0.284 0.284
Panel B: Yield for long-term and short-term bonds
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Yield Yield Yield Yield
Climate risk 0.161** 0.070
(2.219) (1.462)
Ln(Climate risk) 0.203* 0.079
(1.816) (1.008)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,355 27,355 291,746 291,746
R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.839 0.839
Panel C: Gross spread for long-term and short-term bonds
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Spread Spread Spread Spread
Climate risk 0.108** -0.004
(1.972) (-0.072)
Ln(Climate risk) 0.152** 0.019
(2.188) (0.222)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,514 24,514 234,321 234,321
R-squared 0.368 0.369 0.326 0.326
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Table 1.4: Effect of climate risk on municipal bond annualized issuance costs: robustness
This table presents robustness checks for the regressions reported in Table 1.3. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 drop all observations for bonds
that were issued in Orleans Parish. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also drop all observations for bonds issued in coastal counties that are not
assigned a climate risk in Hallegatte et al. (2013). The dependent variable in Panel A is the total annualized issuance cost of a municipal
bond. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the initial yield of the bond. Gross spread is the dependent variable in Panel C. t-statistics,
based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Total annualized issuance cost for long-term and short-term bonds
Long-term Short-term
No New Orleans No unobs. coastal No New Orleans No unobs. coastal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Total cost Total cost Total cost Total cost Total cost Total cost Total cost Total cost
Climate risk 0.379** 0.366** 0.035 -0.035
(2.316) (2.023) (0.339) (-0.234)
Ln(Climate risk) 0.441** 0.414* 0.040 -0.046
(2.250) (1.889) (0.324) (-0.269)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,512 19,512 16,749 16,749 231,030 231,030 196,330 196,330
R-squared 0.295 0.295 0.274 0.274 0.283 0.283 0.252 0.252
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Panel B: Yield for long-term and short-term bonds
Long-term Short-term
No New Orleans No unobs. coastal No New Orleans No unobs. coastal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield
Climate risk 0.249** 0.222* 0.020 -0.067
(1.953) (1.645) (0.200) (-0.463)
Ln(Climate risk) 0.285* 0.241 0.019 -0.084
(1.906) (1.503) (0.167) (-0.513)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,334 27,334 23,422 23,422 291,479 291,479 245,617 245,617
R-squared 0.510 0.510 0.516 0.516 0.835 0.835 0.833 0.833
Panel C: Gross spread for long-term and short-term bonds
Long-term Short-term
No New Orleans No unobs. coastal No New Orleans No unobs. coastal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Climate risk 0.192** 0.194* 0.119 0.147
(2.412) (1.940) (1.131) (1.522)
Ln(Climate risk) 0.220** 0.222* 0.139 0.170
(2.405) (1.946) (1.131) (1.511)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,496 24,496 21,111 21,111 234,067 234,067 199,026 199,026
R-squared 0.347 0.347 0.353 0.353 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.312
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Table 1.5: Maturity
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions of Eq. (1) for varying
term structure specifications. The variable of interest is the log of Climate risk, defined in
Table 1.1. The dependent variable is the total annualized issuance cost of a municipal bond.
Panel A presents results for long-term maturity specifications. Panel B reports results for
short-term maturity specifications. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Long-term specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046
Ln(Climate risk) 0.198* 0.656** 0.205* 0.489* 1.540***
(1.876) (2.171) (1.705) (1.714) (2.967)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,191 6,665 25,307 8,495 2,095
R-squared 0.368 0.232 0.339 0.222 0.160
Panel B: Short-term specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue maturity: < 20 Years < 30 Years < 2036 < 2041 < 2046
Ln(Climate risk) 0.069 0.108 0.098 0.113 0.113
(0.789) (1.272) (1.171) (1.353) (1.347)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204,650 244,091 225,512 242,273 248,642
R-squared 0.227 0.310 0.293 0.320 0.322
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Table 1.6: Placebo tests
This table presents regression results of Eq. (1) for various long-term specifications where
climate risk is assigned to placebo counties. In Panel A, placebo counties are identified as
the counties closest to the climate counties but not located on the coast. In Panel B, the
placebo counties are assigned using nearest neighbor matching on the propensity to be a
climate affected county. Neighbors are matched based on the size of issuances, the number
of CUSIPs per issue, the total number of issues by the county in the sample, and credit
rating. I require all matched counties to be in noncoastal states. The dependent variable
is the total annualized cost to issue a municipal bond. The variable of interest is the log of
Climate risk, defined in Table 1.1. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Geographic matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20 Years ≥ 25 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046
Ln(Climate risk) -0.007 0.135 0.223 0.111 0.012 0.045
(-0.058) (0.738) (0.728) (0.825) (0.092) (0.107)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,191 19,527 6,665 25,307 8,495 2,095
R-squared 0.606 0.578 0.563 0.670 0.630 0.702
Panel B: Nearest neighbor matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20 Years ≥ 25 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046
Ln(Climate risk) -0.061 -0.127 -0.294 -0.057 -0.151 -0.439
(-1.083) (-1.493) (-1.336) (-0.663) (-1.197) (-1.637)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,191 19,527 6,665 25,307 8,495 2,095
R-squared 0.606 0.578 0.563 0.670 0.630 0.703
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Table 1.7: Credit rating split
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions of Eq. (1) for different
credit rating specifications. The variable of interest is the log of Climate risk, defined in
Table 1.1. Bonds included in the “<AA-” sample have a credit rating at issuance below
AA- (or below Moody’s Aa3 if they are not rated by S&P). Bonds included in the “≥AA-”
sample have a credit rating of AA- or higher (or Moody’s Aa3 or higher if they are not rated
by S&P). The long-term sample contains bond issuances with a maximum maturity of 25
years or more. The short-term sample contains bond issuances with a maximum maturity
of less than 25 years. The dependent variable is the total annualized issuance cost of a
municipal bond. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit rating: < AA- ≥ AA- < AA- ≥ AA-
Ln(Climate risk) 0.527** 0.141 0.107 0.091
(2.041) (0.686) (0.878) (0.634)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,339 14,095 43,714 187,529
R-squared 0.609 0.238 0.090 0.724
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Table 1.8: Difference-in-differences of issuance costs around the Stern Review
This table presents difference-in-difference estimates for the total annualized cost to issue a municipal bond before and after the Stern
Review was released. Stern takes a value of one if the bond was issued after the Stern Review was released and zero otherwise. The
Stern Review was released on October 30, 2006. The long-term sample contains bond issuances with a maximum maturity of 25 years or
more. The short-term sample contains bond issuances with a maximum maturity of less than 25 years. Columns 1 and 4 contain bond
issuances for the entire sample. Columns 2 and 5 restrict the sample to bonds issued within a two-year window (one year before until
one year after) around the Stern Review. Columns 3 and 6 restrict the sample to bonds issued within a one-year window (six months
before until six months after) around the Stern Review. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time frame: Full sample Two years One year Full sample Two years One year
Ln(Climate risk) -0.159 -0.242* -0.205 0.091 0.533 -0.064
(-0.727) (-1.708) (-1.254) (0.228) (1.163) (-0.243)
Ln(Climate risk) x Stern 0.607** 0.633** 0.384 0.001 -0.554 -0.138
(2.429) (2.167) (1.295) (0.002) (-1.250) (-0.487)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,561 5,000 2,406 231,295 8,579 4,142
R-squared 0.297 0.220 0.248 0.284 0.124 0.156
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Figure 1.1: Google search volume for “climate change” around the Stern Review
This figure presents the quarterly average search frequency for the term “climate
change” using Google Trends. The search volume is scaled so that 100 represents the
peak search volume for the time frame of 2005 to 2007. The vertical line indicates
the release date of the Stern Review, October 30, 2006.
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Figure 1.2: Climate risk & issuances costs around the Stern Review
This figure presents the difference in municipal bond annualized issuance costs for
counties with climate risk relative to counties without climate risk around the release
of the Stern Review. The coefficients are based on a regression of total annualized
issuance cost on the interaction of climate risk and year-quarter time dummies. The
regression also includes the full set of controls used in the main specification in Table
1.3. Ninety percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by county
of issuance are shown using dotted lines. Coefficients for the five quarters before and
after the event are presented. The vertical line indicates the release date of the Stern
Review, October 30, 2006.
Copyright c© Marcus Painter, 2019.
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Chapter 2 Unlevelling the Playing Field: the Investment Value and Capital
Market Consequences of Alternative Data
“Far from creating a level playing field, where more readily available informa-
tion simply leads to greater market efficiency, the impact of the information
revolution is the opposite: it is creating hard-to access realms for long-term al-
pha generation for those players with the scale and resources to take advantage
of it.”
- Schroders Investment Management1
2.1 Introduction
The proliferation of alternative data has been one of the most striking changes to financial
markets in recent years. Alternative data, also commonly referred to as big data, is any
non-traditional data that can be used in the investment process.2 As the introductory
quote suggests, proponents of this information revolution believe that alternative data has
the potential to uncover fundamental information before the release of more traditional
information sources, such as financial statements or macroeconomic announcements. The
majority of asset managers appear to share this opinion, with a recent report by JP Morgan
estimating asset managers are spending $2-3 billion annually on alternative data.3 Further,
a survey conducted by Standard & Poor’s indicates 80% of asset managers plan to increase
their investments in big data, with only 6% of asset managers believing big data is not
important to their investment process.4
The exponential growth of alternative data sources has significant implications for the
informational environment of the firm. The growing dissemination of alternative data may
only have investment value for the small group of investors who are either able to afford
early access to such information or have a comparative advantage in processing and trading
on the information. In fact, survey evidence indicates the two most cited impediments to
the use of alternative data are high fixed costs and lack of expertise in managing the data.5
Therefore, the rise in alternative data creates a potential informational advantage for large
sophisticated investors relative to small investors.
The goal of this study is to assess the investment value and capital market consequences
of alternative data. To do so, I collect detailed data on parking lot car counts for 163
companies from 2010-2017 from Orbital Insight, a leading provider of data derived from
satellite imagery. An important feature of this data is that Orbital Insight began selling
the data for these companies at different points in time. Specifically, Orbital Insight began
selling data for 54 companies in the summer of 2015, 41 more companies in the summer
1Is Big Data the Key to Bigger Investment Returns? Morningstar. February 23, 2018.
2Examples include social media sentiment analysis (e.g., PsychSignal), crowdsourced investment
research (e.g., Seeking Alpha and Estimize), credit card transactions and consumer spending data
(e.g., Yodlee and Earnest), and satellite images (e.g., Orbital Insight).
3“JP Morgan: Alternative Data Is Altering Investment Landscape” Integrity Research Associates.
June 14, 2017.
4Morningstar, 2018
5“This is the Future of Investing, and You Probably can’t Afford it” Business Insider. May 28, 2017.
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of 2016, and 33 more companies at the beginning of 2017. Additionally, Orbital Insight
collected car count data for 35 companies that were not released in my sample period. This
staggered introduction of companies offers a relatively clean setting to explore the causal
effects of the dissemination of alternative data on its investment value, its impact on the
trading activities of sophisticated and individual investors, and the liquidity of affected
firms.
I first demonstrate that a trading strategy based on alternative data reveals new infor-
mation that predicts stock returns. I construct an investment strategy that each month
goes long stocks in the top quintile of year-over-year car count growth and short stocks in
the bottom quintile. This strategy generates monthly abnormal returns of 1.6% per month.
This result holds in both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios and is robust to
various risk-adjustments. I also find that an interquartile increase in quarterly car count
growth is associated with a 14.47% increase in revenue surprise and a 0.17% increase in
price-scaled unexpected earnings. These results suggest that growth in parking lot traffic
is able to predict stock prices because it conveys important information about firms’ future
cash flows.
I next examine how the investment value of satellite data changes following the dissem-
ination of the data to roughly 70 large asset management companies, most of whom are
hedge fund managers. Somewhat surprisingly, I find the broader dissemination of the data
has virtually no effect on the profitability of the trading strategy. Further, the profitability
of the trading strategy persists even for stocks with characteristics that are associated with
lower limits to arbitrage.
Given the persistent abnormal returns available from trading on alternative data, it is
likely that large sophisticated investors are taking advantage of this opportunity. Hedge
funds rank among the most sophisticated investors (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004); Chen,
Kelly, and Wu (2018)) and are able to execute complex trading strategies (Huang (2017);
Jame (2017)). Additionally, the majority of initial clients for alternative data providers have
been hedge funds.6 Therefore, I test whether sophisticated investors are taking advantage of
alternative data by analyzing the trading behavior and profitability of hedge funds around
the dissemination of satellite data. Before Orbital Insight begins selling the data, I find no
relation between car count growth and abnormal changes in hedge fund holdings. However,
abnormal hedge fund holdings become significantly more responsive to car count growth
after the data is released. This change in hedge fund trading behavior increases profitability
for the funds, as abnormal hedge fund holdings in firms covered by Orbital Insight are
associated with higher abnormal returns once the satellite data is disseminated.
I further investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in relation to the
use of alternative data by examining non-hedge fund asset managers (e.g., mutual funds,
banks, and insurance companies). I find no significant change in the trading behavior or
profitability of non-hedge fund institutions surrounding the release of the satellite data. This
is unsurprising, as conversations with industry professionals and survey data both suggest
that non-hedge fund institutions will be late adopters of alternative data.7 Although these
funds may be able to afford the high fees associated with alternative data, they may find it
too difficult to extract accurate and timely trading signals to justify the expense.
Big data creates a challenge for the subset of investors who are either unaware of the
6“Alternative Data Use Cases Report” Eagle Alpha. April, 2018.
7“Putting Alternative Data to Use in Financial Markets” Greenwich Associates. September 12,
2017.
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data or unable to take advantage of it. In particular, individual investors lack the re-
sources to obtain and extract profitable signals from alternative data. Further, individuals
investors’ tendency to be contrarian traders (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000); Kaniel, Saar,
and Titman (2007)) means they are likely the liquidity suppliers for the demand created by
alternative data. Consistent with smaller investors being unable to utilize alternative data,
I find individual investor demand becomes negatively associated with car count growth af-
ter Orbital Insight begins selling the data. Further, individual investor demand predicts
negative abnormal announcement returns once the satellite data is released.
My final tests analyze how firms are affected by the release of alternative data. The
informational advantage for large sophisticated investors due to alternative data has im-
portant implications for firms’ liquidity. On the one hand, the availability of alternative
data reduces the information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders, which could
enhance liquidity (Zhu, 2018). On the other hand, big data increases the information
asymmetry between sophisticated investors and individual investors. In particular, theory
predicts market makers may react to the the risks of dealing with informed traders by in-
creasing bid-ask spreads (Copeland and Galai (1983); Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Which
effect dominates is ultimately an empirical question. Consistent with the rise of information
asymmetry between sophisticated and individual investors being the dominant influence, I
find that adverse selection arising from the availability of alternative data leads to higher
bid-ask spreads and amihud illiquidity ratios for treated firms.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the
growing literature that uses big data to predict stock prices and firm fundamentals. Recent
studies show that the use of textual analysis to gauge investor opinion from blogs Seeking
Alpha (Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang, 2014) and Twitter (Bartov, Faurel, and Mohanram,
2016) can be used to predict future stock returns and earnings surprises. Huang (2017)
uses data on product reviews from Amazon.com to show that consumer opinions contain
relevant information for stock pricing and that hedge fund holdings are positively correlated
with changes in product reviews. Jame, Johnston, Markov, and Wolfe (2016) find that
crowdsourced forecasts from Estimize are incrementally useful in predicting earnings. Da,
Engelberg, and Gao (2011) use data on search frequency from Google and find that an
increase in search frequency predicts higher short-term stock prices. While prior research
using data similar to Orbital Insight’s satellite data finds earnings and revenue predictability
(Froot, Kang, Ozik, and Sadka (2017); Zhu (2018)), my study is the first to construct a
profitable monthly trading strategy based on satellite data. Additionally, this paper is the
first to show that the profitability of trading strategies based on alternative data is unrelated
to its broader dissemination, suggesting the alpha decay thought to be associated with the
implementation of big data investment strategies may be less extreme than once expected.
Second, this paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on how alternative data
impacts financial markets. Froot et al. (2017) develop a proxy for real-time corporate sales
using data from mobile phones and tablets to show that managers bias earnings forecasts
depending on the firm’s real-time performance. Zhu (2018) argues the release of alternative
datasets reduces information acquisition costs, ultimately leading to greater stock price
efficiency, less insider trading, and more efficient investing by the firm’s managers. My
paper contributes to this literature by being the first to show that sophisticated investors
(specifically, hedge funds) benefit from the dissemination of alternative data while individual
investors suffer.
Third, this paper adds to the literature on asymmetric information between investors.
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Looking at a reduction in information asymmetry between investors following Regulation
Fair Disclosure, which disallowed the selective disclosure of material information, Chiy-
achantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong, and Wood (2004) and Eleswarapu, Thompson, and
Venkataraman (2004) find that stock liquidity improves following the regulation. Focusing
on the rise of investment research websites, Farrell, Green, Jame, and Markov (2018) show
that stocks that have reductions in coverage on the website Seeking Alpha have higher
bid-ask spreads and price impact. My paper complements these findings, as I show that
information asymmetry and liquidity are also negatively related in the setting of alternative
data. My findings are also consistent with studies regarding the rise in information asym-
metry due to an exogenous reduction in sell-side analyst coverage. Kelly and Ljungqvist
(2012) find that bid-ask spreads and amihud illiquidity ratios both rise after a reduction in
analysts and Chen et al. (2018) show that hedge funds trade and profit more after this de-
creased analyst coverage. Looking specifically at the release of alternative data, Zhu (2018)
finds an increase in stock price efficiency, suggesting a decrease in asymmetric information
between firm insiders and investors. Rather than studying the relation between insiders and
investors, my paper focuses on the information environment between different subgroups
of investors, finding that asymmetric information rises in this setting and leads to lower
liquidity.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Satellite Image Data
I obtain data on parking lot car counts from Orbital Insight, an image processing company
that uses machine learning to convert satellite images into quantitative data. My sample
period begins in January 2010 and ends in December 2017.8 Orbital Insight uses a repre-
sentative sample of each firm’s parking lots to construct a variable for the average number
of cars at a firm’s retail stores on a given day. Their normalization process accounts for
variation in traffic at different times of day as well as factors unique to certain stores. For
example, the normalization process considers whether a Wal-Mart is a standard location
or a larger Super Wal-Mart location. Notably, data on traffic volume is generally available
around 16 hours after an image is taken, so investors can make timely trades based on this
information.
Figure 2.1 shows a sample parking lot image for a Wal-Mart store in Arizona. Orbital
Insight draws a “mask” for each parking lot in order to reduce the possibility that cars
parked at other stores enter the data. Each circle in the figure represents a car identified
by the algorithm. Only circles within the shaded area are counted towards Wal-Mart’s car
count for that day.
To predict future monthly stock returns, I measure traffic growth as the difference
between the log of the average car count for a month minus the log of average car count
12 months prior. This method of measuring growth reduces the possibility that noise from
seasonality will affect the predictive power of the measure. Figure 2.2 shows average daily
car counts for firms in my sample, emphasizing the importance of adjusting for seasonality
in parking lot traffic. The average car count for all stocks is shown in panel A. The graph
shows that average car counts spike during November and December as consumers prepare
8Note that the data from Orbital Insight starts in 2009, with the first year being used to train their
model.
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for the holiday season. Average car counts are lower in January and February, likely due to
cold weather dissuading consumers from leaving their homes. Panels B and C show seasonal
car counts for Wal-Mart and Home Depot, respectively. Wal-Mart’s average car counts are
similar to the average covered firms, with more cars in parking lots in December and fewer
cars in January. Home Depot follows a unique pattern, as the bulk of the company’s sales
come in spring. As a result, Home Depot’s car counts are higher than average from April
to June. These differing patterns in car counts are adjusted for by using the year-over-year
car count measure.
To illustrate how micro-level traffic patterns reveal novel information about stock prices,
consider Figure 2.3, which compares cumulative year-over-year growth in car traffic with
cumulative stock returns for Bed Bath and Beyond from 2011 to 2017. The two variables
trend in similar directions, though the growth in car count variable appears to be a leading
indicator of stock returns. The satellite data shows a growth in car count for Bed Bath and
Beyond from the beginning of the sample and peaking at the start of 2013. The cumulative
stock return follows a similar upward trend but does not peak until the end of 2013. A
downward trend in car count begins in February of 2013, which is not reflected in stock
prices until November of 2013. A final decline in car counts begins in April 2015, which
follows closely with a decline in stock returns. This example represents a systematic pattern
across US retailers: traffic patterns reveal novel information about stock prices that can be
used to generate abnormal returns.
I merge the satellite data with stock return data from CRSP and firm accounting data
from Compustat. I also obtain factor data for market return (MKTRF), size (SMB),
value (HML), momentum (UMD), profitability (RMW), and investment (CMA) from Ken
French’s data library.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of covered firms as separated
by each release period. The average growth in car count is slightly negative at -0.5% with
an interquartile range of 8.08%. Orbital Insight had two main decision criteria for choosing
which firms to cover in their initial release. First, the firms had to be large U.S. firms
that would therefore be covered by a larger number of investors. Second, the companies
must have enough store locations to generate a reliable normalized measure of car counts.
Therefore, the size and level of turnover of firms in Release 1 are larger on average than
in subsequent releases. Firms in Release 1 also tend to be more value stocks, as evidenced
by their lower average book-to-market. I include these characteristics as well as past stock
returns in all regressions to control for differences in these characteristics between release
periods.
2.2.2 Institutional Investor Holdings
To identify institutional investors, I use the 13f institutional holdings data from Thomson
Reuters. Institutions with over $100 million in assets are required to fill out the quarterly
13f forms for all U.S. equity positions exceeding $200,000 or 10,000 shares. I identify hedge
funds in this database following the methodology of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and
Griffin and Xu (2009). More specifically, hedge funds are identified by matching the 13f
fund names with names from five hedge fund databases: BarclayHedge, HFR, Eureka,
Lipper TASS, and Morningstar.9 I designate all funds not matched through this process as
9See Cao, Chen, Goetzmann, and Liang (2016) for more detail on the hedge fund identification
process.
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non-hedge funds. Non-hedge funds include other institutional investors like mutual funds,
insurance companies, and banks. The final sample for the 2010 to 2017 period includes 659
hedge funds and 4,427 non-hedge funds.
I define abnormal holdings for hedge funds and non-hedge funds using the following
equation:
Abn HFi,q = (
Shares OwnedHFi,q
Shares Outi,q
) −
∑t=q−1
t=q−4(
Shares OwnedHFi,t
Shares Outi,t
)
4
(2.1)
where Shares Ownedi,q is the total number of shares of stock i held by hedge funds in
quarter q and Shares Outi,q is the total number of shares outstanding for stock i in quarter
q. Abnormal holdings for non-hedge funds are defined analogously. Table 2.1 shows that
average abnormal holdings of firms in my sample for hedge funds (non-hedge funds) is -0.07
(0.15) with an interquartile range of 3.37 (5.37).
2.2.3 Individual Investor Order Imbalances
I use the Trade and Quote (TAQ) dataset to measure individual investor activity. I follow
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), who provide a clean method to identify individual
investor order flow. Boehmer et al. (2017)’s method exploits the tendency for individual
investors’ order flow to be internalized or sent to wholesalers. Individual orders typically
receive price improvements of a fraction of a penny to compensate for this internalization
or whole-selling. Therefore, individual initiated buy orders will have transaction prices
slightly below the round penny and sell orders slightly above the round penny. Further,
these transactions typically happen off the exchange and are therefore labeled in TAQ with
exchange code “D”. These institutional features allow me to identify a clean sample of
individual investor initiated transactions in order to measure individual investor demand.
After collecting information on individual investor trading activity, I compute the fol-
lowing order imbalance measures:
Indiv OIB V oli,t =
Ind Buy V oli,t − Ind Sell V oli,t
Ind Buy V oli,t + Ind Sell V oli,t
(2.2)
Indiv OIB Tradei,t =
Ind Buy Tradei,t − Ind Sell T radei,t
Ind Buy Tradei,t + Ind Sell T radei,t
(2.3)
where Ind Buy V oli,t is the average buy volume by individual investors in stock i during
time t and Ind Sell V oli,t is the average sell volume in stock i during time t. Similarly,
Ind Buy Tradei,t is the average number of buy trades by individual investors in stock i
during time t and Ind Sell T radei,t is the average number of sell trades in stock i during
time t. The average Ind Buy V ol in my sample is -1.9% with an interquartile range of
16.8% and the average Ind Buy Trade is -1.9% with an interquartile range of 15.3%.
2.3 The Investment Value of Satellite Imagery
2.3.1 Stock Returns
In order to test whether growth in traffic to firms’ stores predicts stock returns, I form
portfolios based on the growth in car count measure described in section 2.2.1. At the
34
beginning of each month, I sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on traffic growth and
then track their performance over the following month. Quintile 5 contains firms with the
highest growth in car count, while quintile 1 contains those with the lowest growth. I then
form a high-minus-low (H-L) portfolio which goes long the stocks in quintile 5 and shorts
those in quintile 1.
The performance results of the quintile portfolio sorts are reported in Table 2.2. I
analyze returns using raw excess returns as well as CAPM, four-, and six-factor alphas for
each portfolio. The four-factor alpha contains the excess market return (MKTRF) as well
as the size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors of Fama and French (1993)
and Carhart (1997). The six-factor model adds the profitability (RMW) and investment
(CMA) factors of Fama and French (2015). I present equal-weighted returns in Panel A
and value-weighted returns in Panel B.
The results in Table 2.2 show that trading based on signals generated from alternative
data can lead to significant outperformance. Across all return specifications, portfolio
returns increase monotonically with the prior month’s growth in car count. Focusing on
excess returns, the highest quintile of stocks earns 1.86% per month while the lowest quintile
earns 0.26% resulting in a long-short portfolio of 1.6%. Alphas generated from the CAPM,
four-, and six-factor models suggest that factor exposures cannot explain the statistical and
economic significance of the long-short portfolio. The H-L portfolios for equal-weighted
returns are significant at the 1% level for all factor models and have alphas that range
between 1.58% and 1.65% per month. For value-weighted returns, the H-L portfolios earn
monthly alphas between 1.56% and 1.67% and are statistically significant at the 1% level.10
2.3.2 Return Predictability Post-Dissemination
In this section, I test the persistence of portfolio returns after the satellite data becomes
available to the market. The economically large monthly alpha generated by this trading
strategy creates a strong incentive for investors to seek out alternative datasets in order
to capture excess profits. If enough investors begin trading on this information then the
alpha generated by this strategy will eventually be arbitraged away. However, there are
several arguments for why the excess profits from this strategy will persist after the data
becomes available. First, the cost of alternative datasets will prohibit smaller investors
from accessing them. Second, many larger discretionary funds who can afford alternative
datasets do not have the right infrastructure to incorporate the data into their discretionary
trading strategies.11 Finally, the investors who have the resources to purchase and develop
trading strategies from alternative data may identify different signals from the same dataset.
Therefore, it is possible that the alphas generated from the trading strategy developed in
this paper are not immediately arbitraged away.
10In the appendix I confirm that growth in car count also predicts firm fundamentals. Specifically, I
find an interquartile increase in growth in car count is associated with a 14.47% increase in revenue
surprise and a 0.17% increase in price-scaled unexpected earnings. Further, I confirm a substan-
tial portion of the return realization from satellite data stems from earnings announcements, as
an interquartile increase in growth in car count is associated with a 71 basis point increase in
cumulative abnormal announcement returns.
11“Revenge of the Humans: How Discretionary Managers Can Crush Systematics” Leigh Drogen,
CEO of Estimize. May 8, 2017.
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To test between these two possibilities, I examine the persistence of portfolio returns
using a difference-in-differences framework. Specifically, I run the following regression:
Excess Returni,t+1 = α+ β1 ∗Growth in Car Counti,t + β2 ∗Release
+ β3 ∗ (Growth in Car Counti,t ×Release) + β4 ∗ Firm Controlsi,t
+ β5 ∗ Firm FE + β6 ∗ Y ear Month FE + εi,t
(2.4)
where Excess Returni,t+1 is the stock return in month t + 1 for stock i in excess of the
risk-free rate, Growth in Car Counti,t is the growth in traffic for firm i in month t, and
Release is an indicator variable equal to zero for a firm in months prior to Orbital Insight
releasing the data, and equal to one in the months after Orbital Insight begins selling
the data. Therefore, Growth in Car Counti,t × Release captures the marginal change in
return predictability of Growth in Car Counti,t for a firm whose data has been disseminated
relative to before the data is released. A negative coefficient on the interaction term would
indicate that investors trade away the profitability of the trading strategy once the data
becomes available.
Firm Controlsi,t is a set of firm characteristics for firm i in month t. I use the following
firm characteristics as controls: the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month,
the log of book-to-market at the end of the prior month, the stock return from month t−12
to t − 2, the log of growth in shares outstanding from month t − 36 to month t − 1, the
change in net working capital minus depreciation in the prior fiscal year, the return on
assets in the prior fiscal year, and the log of growth in total assets in the prior fiscal year.
Lewellen (2015) shows that these seven characteristics have significant predictive power for
stock returns. I include firm and year-month fixed effects and cluster standard errors by
firm and year-month.
Table 2.3 presents the results of the difference-in-differences estimation. I first report
results for return predictability for the entire sample in column 1. The coefficient on growth
in car count is 0.033, significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, this means that an
interquartile range increase in growth in car count is associated with a 26.6 basis point
increase in the following month’s excess return. This result suggests that traffic growth
contains information which cannot be garnered from firm characteristics. Column 2 in-
cludes the indicator variable for whether Orbital Insight has released a firm’s data as well
as its interaction with growth in car count. The coefficient on the interaction term is indis-
tinguishable from zero at standard levels of significance. This result provides evidence that
the profitability of the trading strategy is not immediately traded away when the data is
disseminated.
2.3.3 Limits to Arbitrage
A potential explanation for the persistence of the return predictability is arbitrage con-
straints. The profitability of the trading strategy may be restricted to stocks that limit
arbitrageurs by being difficult to analyze or trade in large quantities. I test whether limits
to arbitrage explain the persistence of return predictability of alternative data using three
proxies to identify stocks more likely to have arbitrage constraints: firm size, bid-ask spread,
and the amihud illiquidity ratio. For firm size, I use the market equity of the firm. I calcu-
late bid-ask spread as the difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the average
of the ask and bid prices. I follow Amihud (2002) and calculate the illiquidity measure as
the average ratio of daily absolute return to dollar trading volume. I test the difference-in-
difference regression from equation (2.4) on subsamples split at the median of these three
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proxies. If the persistent profitability of the portfolio returns are due to stocks with limits
to arbitrage, then the interaction term should be significantly negative for large firms, firms
with low bid-ask spreads, and firms with low amihud illiquidity ratios and insignificant for
small firms, firms with high bid-ask spreads, and firms with high amihud illiquidity ratios.
Columns 3 through 8 of Table 2.3 report the results of the subsample splits. I find that,
regardless of a firm’s arbitrage constraints, the trading strategy based on parking lot traffic
growth remains a significant predictor of future excess returns. Specifically, the coefficient
on the interaction between growth in car count and release is statistically insignificant in
each subsample split. These results suggest that the profitability of the alternative data
trading strategy post-dissemination is not due to limits to arbitrage.
2.4 The Capital Market Consequences of Alternative Data
The investment value contained in alternative data creates an incentive for sophisticated
investors to implement the data into their trading strategies. There is evidence that hedge
fund managers represent the most sophisticated investors, as they often outperform mutual
funds (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft, 1999) and are able to develop informed
trading strategies based on novel information (Huang, 2017). In this section I investigate
how sophisticated investors adapt to the introduction of alternative data by examining the
trading behavior of hedge funds around the dissemination of Orbital Insight’s satellite data.
Additionally, I study the trading behavior of non-hedge fund institutions and individual in-
vestors. Though non-hedge funds are likely able to afford the expense of alternative data,
they are less likely to be able to turn that data into a profitable trading strategy. Individual
investors lack the resources to purchase or develop trading strategies from alternative data.
Further, individuals investors’ tendency to be contrarian traders (Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2000); Kaniel et al. (2007)) means they are likely the liquidity suppliers for the demand
created by alternative data. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between the Or-
bital Insight trading signal and hedge fund trading, no significant relationship between the
trading signal and non-hedge fund institution trading, and a negative relationship between
the trading signal and individual investor trading. Further, I expect hedge fund trades to
become more profitable after the release of Orbital Insight’s data, non-hedge fund trades
to have no change in profitability, and individual investor trades to become less profitable.
2.4.1 Institutional Investor Holdings
To test how institutional investor trading behavior changes after the release of alternative
data, I run difference-in-differences regressions of abnormal holdings for hedge funds and
non-hedge funds on growth in car count around the dissemination of the satellite data.
Because institutional holdings are reported quarterly, I measure growth in car count at a
quarterly frequency as well. Specifically, in each quarter I examine the change in abnormal
holdings for hedge funds and non-hedge funds using the following regression model:
Abnormal Holdingsi,t = β1 ∗Growth in Car Counti,t + β2 ∗Release
+ β3 ∗ (Growth in Car Counti,t ×Release) + β4 ∗ Firm Controlsi,t
+ β5 ∗ Firm FE + β6 ∗ Y ear Quarter FE + εi,t
(2.5)
where Abnormal Holdingsi,t is the level of abnormal holdings for either hedge funds
or non-hedge funds in stock i for quarter t. I test the relationship between abnormal
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holdings and growth in car count in contemporaneous quarters as clients of Orbital In-
sight are able to access the data with only a 16-hour lag. Therefore, the coefficient
on (Growth in Car Counti,t × Release) estimates the sensitivity of fund’s holdings to
the growth in car count measure in the post-dissemination period relative to the pre-
dissemination period. I include stock-level controls for prior quarter returns adjusted for
the returns of the CRSP value-weighted index, book-to-market, size, and turnover. I cluster
standard errors by firm and year-quarter.
Table 2.4 presents the regression results. The coefficient on growth in car count is
insignificant in all specifications for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds, implying that
neither type of institutional investor was able to trade based on parking lot growth prior
to the availability of the satellite data. However, the coefficient on the interaction term is
significantly positive for abnormal hedge fund holdings and insignificant for non-hedge fund
holdings. Specifically, the regression using year-quarter fixed effects (column 1) shows that
an interquartile increase in quarterly growth in car count (8.7%) leads to a 50 (8.7*0.057)
basis point increase in abnormal hedge fund holdings in firms whose satellite data has been
released relative to firms whose data has not been released. A 50 basis point increase in
abnormal hedge fund holdings represents 14.2% percent of the interquartile range (3.37%).
Looking within-firm, column 2 shows that an interquartile increase in car count growth is
associated with a 70.47 basis point increase in abnormal hedge fund holdings for a firm in
the post-dissemination period relative to the pre-dissemination period. The coefficient on
the interaction term remains positive and significant when both year-quarter and firm fixed
effects are included.
The results when looking at non-hedge funds show no effect of satellite data availability
on abnormal holdings. The specification including year-quarter and firm fixed effects for ab-
normal non-hedge fund holdings leads to an insignificant coefficient on the interaction term
of -0.014. These findings are consistent with the expectation that sophisticated investors
take advantage of the availability of alternative data.
2.4.2 Institutional Investor Profitability
I next test whether institutional holdings become more profitable after alternative data
is available. I hypothesize that hedge funds’ better information processing abilities allow
them to profit more on trades in stocks that have alternative data available. I estimate
the following regression model to examine how abnormal holdings for hedge funds and
non-hedge funds perform around the release of Orbital Insight’s data:
Adjusted Stock Returnsi,t+1 = β1 ∗Abnormal Holdingsi,t + β2 ∗Release
+ β3 ∗ (Abnormal Holdingsi,t ×Release) + β4 ∗ Firm Controlsi,t
+ β5 ∗ Firm FE + β6 ∗ Y ear Quarter FE + εi,t
(2.6)
where all variables are defined the same as in previous regressions. I expect a significantly
positive coefficient on (Abnormal Holdingsi,t ×Release) for hedge funds and a coefficient
near zero for non-hedge funds.
Results for regressions using equation (2.6) are reported in Table 2.5. As expected,
abnormal hedge fund holdings become more predictive of future returns once there is alter-
native data coverage on a stock. In terms of economic magnitude, the regression in column
1 shows that an interquartile increase in abnormal hedge fund holdings is associated with
1.35% (3.734*0.004) increase in the next quarter’s adjusted stock returns in stocks whose
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data has been released relative to unreleased stocks. This 1.35% increase represents 6.36%
of the interquartile range for adjusted stock returns. The results when using firm fixed
effects show an interquartile increase in abnormal hedge fund holding leads to a 2.02%
(3.374*0.006) increase in returns for a stock after its data has been made available relative
to the pre-dissemination period. The coefficient on the interaction term remains significant
when both time and firm fixed effects are included. Columns 4 through 6 show abnormal
non-hedge fund holdings have no change in stock return predictability around the release
of the satellite data, as the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant in all specifi-
cations. Collectively, the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that hedge funds are better
able to take advantage of big data compared to other institutional investors.
2.4.3 Individual Investor Trading
Given the large expense to access big data, individual investors are not the target client for
alternative data providers. Because individual investors are on average contrarian traders
(Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000); Kaniel et al. (2007)), it is possible that individuals provide
liquidity to meet sophisticated investor demand for stocks with alternative data coverage.
Although contrarian trading has historically led to positive excess returns for individual
investors (Kaniel et al. (2007)), the asymmetric information environment brought on by
alternative data could lead to negative returns on trades made by individual investors. In
this section, I test this idea by examining how the sensitivity of individual order demand in
relation to growth in car count changes around the release of alternative data. Specifically,
I run the following regression:
Individual OIBi,t = β1 ∗Growth in Car Counti,t + β2 ∗Release
+ β3 ∗ (Growth in Car Counti,t ×Release) + β4 ∗ Firm Controlsi,t
+ β5 ∗ Firm FE + β6 ∗ Y ear Month FE + εi,t
(2.7)
where Individual OIBi,t refers to either the volume or trade order imbalance for individual
investors in stock i in month t. The coefficient on (Growth in Car Counti,t × Release)
measures how individual investor demand for a stock relative to a firm’s traffic growth
changes when alternative data is released.
The first three columns of Table 2.6 provide results of estimating equation (2.7) for
the order imbalance of individual investor trade volume. Interestingly, the coefficient on
growth in car count is significantly positive (thought economically small with a magnitude of
0.0004), suggesting that individual investors are able to trade in the same direction as traffic
growth before alternative data is available. This result is consistent with the literature that
finds individual investors are informed (Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2012); Kelley and
Tetlock (2013); Boehmer et al. (2017)). However, individual order flow becomes significantly
less sensitive to traffic growth once access to the satellite data becomes available. Looking at
column 3, a 1% increase in growth in car count is associated with 6.4% decrease in individual
volume order demand in the post-dissemination period relative to the pre-dissemination
period. Similar results are found when looking at the order imbalance for the number of
individual trades in columns 4 through 6.
2.4.4 Indiviudal Investor Profitability
I next investigate the profitability of individual investor demand for stocks whose parking
lot data is sold by Orbital Insight. Due to the granular nature of TAQ data, I am able to ex-
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amine how investor demand immediately prior to earning announcements is able to predict
announcement returns. The decrease in individual investor demand to traffic growth shown
in Table 2.6 suggests that individual demand will become less informed after alternative
data becomes available. I use the following model to examine whether there is a change in
individual investor profitability:
Cumulative Abnormal Returnsi,t,d to d+3 = β1 ∗ Individual OIBi,t,d−3 to d−1 + β2 ∗Release
+ β3 ∗ (Individual OIBi,t,d−3 to d−1 ×Release) + β4 ∗ Firm Controlsi,t
+ β5 ∗ Firm FE + β6 ∗ Y ear Quarter FE + εi,t
(2.8)
where Cumulative Abnormal Returnsi,t,d to d+3 is the abnormal announcement return for
stock i′s earnings announcement for quarter t from the day of the announcement until
three days after and Individual OIBi,t,d−3 to d−1 is the individual order imbalance for
either volume or trades for stock i for the three days prior to the earnings announcement
for quarter t. The interaction term will therefore measure how the profitability of individual
investor demand changes after the introduction of alternative data to the market.
Table 2.7 reports the regression results. Consistent with expectations, individual in-
vestor demand becomes significantly worse at predicting announcements returns after satel-
lite data for a company becomes available. Looking at column 3, a 1% increase in three
day individual order imbalance is associated with a 4.7 basis point decrease in cumula-
tive abnormal announcement returns in the post-dissemination period relative to the pre-
dissemination period. This result holds for all specifications shown and for order imbalance
measures using both volume of shares and number of shares traded.12 Together, Tables
2.6 and 2.7 provide supporting evidence for the notion that individual investors become
relatively less informed when alternative data is introduced.
2.4.5 Liquidity Implications for Affected Firms
The introduction of alternative data to the market represents a change in the informational
environment between market participants. As large sophisticated investors are the only
group that can feasibly make use of alternative data, these investors gain an informational
advantage over other investors in the market. Theoretical research generally concludes that
an increase in information asymmetry between market participants leads to an increase
in stock illiquidity.13 Therefore, it is possible that the release of satellite data by Orbital
Insight leads to a decrease in the liquidity of affected firms’ stocks.
Table 2.8 reports evidence consistent with this conjecture. The table reports regression
results of stock liquidity measures on an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s satellite
data has become available to investors. I use the bid-ask spread and the amihud illiquidity
ratio as measures of stock liquidity. Looking at columns 2 and 5, which analyze within-firm
changes in liquidity by including firm-level fixed effects, I find a significant increase in both
liquidity measures. Specifically, the release of Orbital Insight’s satellite data is associated
with an increase in the amihud illiquidity ratio of 0.003 which represent a 30.00% increase
12Results are also robust to using order imbalance measures for a one day or five day period prior
to the earning announcement date.
13Some examples of theoretical papers in this line of research include Copeland and Galai (1983),
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and Easley and O’hara (1987).
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from the mean amihud of 0.01. Similarly, the bid-ask ratio increases by 0.04, representing
a 30.08% increase from the mean.
I account for omitted factors that could introduce a time trend by including year-
month fixed effects in columns 3 and 6. Release is identified in this setting due to the
staggered introduction of the satellite data by Orbital Insight. Though the magnitudes on
the coefficients are reduced, I continue to find positive coefficients on the release indicator
variable for both liquidity measures. Under this specification, the amihud illiquidity ratio for
firms whose data has been disseminated is 20% higher than the average firm. Likewise, the
bid-ask spread is 3.8% higher (though the coefficient is insignificant at conventional levels).
These results are consistent with the literature that finds that stock liquidity decreases in
environments with increasing informational symmetry.
2.5 Conclusion
I contribute to the understanding of alternative data’s impact on financial markets by doc-
umenting the investment value of a leading satellite imagery provider’s data and examining
how the dissemination of this data affects investor trading behavior. Using a measure of
the growth in the number of cars in US retail firms’ parking lots, I show that a long-short
trading strategy based on alternative data earns monthly alphas of 1.6%. These abnormal
returns persist even after the data is made available to market participants.
Using the staggered introduction of the satellite data as a natural experiment, I find
market participants react to the dissemination of this data. In particular, hedge funds
begin to trade in the direction of the growth in car count measure after the data is released,
while individual investor demand trends the opposite way. Further, hedge fund trades
become more profitable and individual investor demand becomes less profitable. Finally,
the increase in information asymmetry between market participants leads to lower liquidity
for covered firms’ stocks.
Alternative data has become an essential resource for investors looking for an infor-
mational advantage. This type of data will continue to impact financial markets as more
datasets are introduced. Collectively, my findings illustrate the power of alternative data
both in its ability to generate value and in its influence on the functioning of capital mar-
kets.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for firms with satellite data from January 2010 through December 2017. Growth in car count is
the natural log of car count minus the natural log of car count from 12 months prior. Car count is the monthly average of cars observed
each day in a firm’s parking lots. Excess return is the monthly stock return in excess of the risk free rate. Abn HF is the current quarter
aggregate hedge fund holdings for a stock minus the average aggregate hedge fund holdings over the prior four quarters. Abn nonHF is
calculated analogously for all non-hedge fund institutions. Indiv OIB Vol is the monthly volume of trades initiated as buys by individual
investors minus the volume of trades initiated as sells by individual investors divided by the sum of both buy and sell individual-initiated
orders. Indiv OIB Trade is calculated analogously for the number of individual trades. Bid-Ask is the monthly average of the daily ask
price of a stock minus the bid price of a stock divided by the average of the ask and bid price. Amihud is the absolute return of a stock
divided by that stock’s dollar volume and multiplied by 1000000. ln(Size) is the log of the market capitalization of the firm, calculated
as the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. ln(B/M) is the log book value of equity minus the log market value of
equity. ln(Turnover) is the log of the number of shares traded by shares outstanding over the prior 12 months. Return data comes from
CRSP, accounting data from Compustat, institutional investor data from 13f filings, individual investor data from TAQ, and satellite
data from Orbital Insight.
Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th
Growth in Car Count -0.495 7.201 -4.580 -0.702 3.495
Excess Return 0.642 18.425 -10.774 -0.508 10.939
Abn HF -0.067 3.538 -1.776 -0.063 1.598
Abn nonHF 0.152 5.921 -2.417 0.097 2.951
Indiv OIB Vol -0.019 0.167 -0.100 -0.009 0.068
Indiv OIB Trade -0.019 0.146 -0.091 -0.01 0.062
Bid-Ask 0.133 0.213 0.028 0.053 0.119
Amihud 0.010 0.0280 0.0001 0.0006 0.004
Full Sample Release=1 Release=2 Release=3 Beta-Mode
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
ln(Size) 7.559 1.70 8.373 1.82 6.846 1.24 7.382 1.69 7.059 1.29
ln(B/M) -0.898 0.89 -0.990 0.77 -0.852 1.14 -0.851 0.76 -0.810 0.79
ln(Turnover) -1.553 0.72 -1.375 0.58 -1.686 0.73 -1.530 0.88 -1.787 0.69
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Table 2.2: Growth in Car Count Portfolio Sorts - Quintiles
This table reports abnormal return estimates for a trading strategy that sorts stocks into
quintiles based on car counts from satellite parking lot data. Stocks are sorted at the
beginning of every calendar month based on the growth in car count in the prior month.
In Panel A (B) stocks are equal (value) weighted within a given portfolio. Portfolios are
rebalanced monthly. The “H-L” portfolio represents the difference in returns between stocks
with the highest growth in car count (Q5) and stocks with the lowest car count (Q1).
Abnormal returns are reported as the return in excess of the market, CAPM alpha, four-
factor alpha, and six-factor alpha. The four-factor model includes factors for the excess
market return (MKTRF) as well as size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD)
factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The six-factor model adds the
profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors of Fama and French (2015). t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Equal Weights Q1(Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(High) H-L
Excess Returns 0.26 0.69 0.98* 1.07** 1.86*** 1.60***
(0.46) (1.27) (1.76) (2.06) (3.13) (5.57)
CAPM Alpha -1.03*** -0.55 -0.24 -0.13 0.54 1.58***
(-2.77) (-1.40) (-0.60) (-0.37) (1.31) (5.49)
Four-Factor Alpha -0.96*** -0.50 -0.16 -0.08 0.69* 1.65***
(-2.67) (-1.28) (-0.42) (-0.26) (1.94) (5.70)
Six-Factor Alpha -1.15*** -0.72** -0.41 -0.30 0.45 1.60***
(-3.38) (-2.04) (-1.20) (1.09) (1.47) (5.41)
Panel B: Value Weights Q1(Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(High) H-L
Excess Returns 0.74 0.97** 1.23*** 1.59*** 2.41*** 1.67***
(1.41) (2.05) (3.00) (3.61) (4.79) (4.43)
CAPM Alpha -0.38 -0.03 0.32 0.71* 1.27*** 1.65***
(-0.98) (-0.09) (0.97) (1.93) (3.68) (4.19)
Four-Factor Alpha -0.47 -0.11 0.17 0.59* 1.15*** 1.62***
(-1.20) (-0.29) (0.55) (1.71) (3.41) (4.41)
Six-Factor Alpha -0.57 -0.3 -0.03 0.42 0.99*** 1.56***
(-1.46) (-0.91) (-0.10) (1.35) (3.07) (4.24)
43
Table 2.3: Alternative Data Return Predictability Post-Dissemination
This table reports regressions of the following form:
Excess Returni,t+1 = α+ β1 ∗Growth in Car Counti,t + β2 ∗Release+ β3 ∗ (Growth in Car Counti,t ×Release) + β4 ∗Conti,t + εi,t.
Excess Returni,t+1 is the return on stock i in month t in excess of the risk-free rate. Growth in Car Counti,t is the natural log of car
count for firm i in month t minus the natural log of car count from 12 months prior. Release is an indicator variable equal to one in
months when a stock’s satellite data is available to market participants and zero otherwise. Conti,t is a vector of the following controls:
the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month, the log of book-to-market at the end of the prior month, the stock return
from month t− 12 to t− 2, the log of growth in shares outstanding from month t− 36 to month t− 1, the change in net working capital
minus depreciation in the prior fiscal year, the return on assets in the prior fiscal year, and the log of growth in total assets in the prior
fiscal year. Columns 3 through 8 split the sample at the median of market equity, bid-ask spread, and amihud illiquidity ratio (defined
in Table 2.1). t-statistics, calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year-month, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Excess Stock Return
Full Full Large Low Low Small High High
Sample Sample Firms Spread Amihud Firms Spread Amihud
Growth in Car Count 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.018* 0.013 0.017*
(3.860) (3.312) (4.000) (4.148) (3.746) (1.985) (1.364) (1.913)
Growth in Car Count × Release 0.028 0.012 0.002 0.018 0.026 0.042 0.023
(0.870) (0.221) (0.037) (0.317) (0.698) (1.095) (0.608)
Release 0.035 1.136** 0.368 0.785 -1.555 -0.333 -1.586
(0.067) (2.152) (0.753) (1.583) (-1.350) (-0.269) (-1.353)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YM FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,679 10,679 5,388 5,458 5,534 5,290 5,162 5,086
R-squared 0.195 0.195 0.259 0.265 0.250 0.199 0.202 0.203
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Table 2.4: Growth in Car Count and Institutional Holdings
This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of the following form:
Abnormal Holdingsi,t = β1 ∗Growth in Car Counti,t + β2 ∗Release+ β3 ∗ (Growth in Car Counti,t ×Release) + β4 ∗ Conti,t + εi,t
Abnormal Holdingsi,t is the level of abnormal holdings for either hedge funds or non-hedge funds in stock i for quarter t. Conti,t is
a vector of the following controls: prior quarter returns adjusted for the returns of the CRSP value-weighted index, book-to-market,
size, and turnover. All other variables are defined in previous tables. t-statistics, calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and
year-quarter, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Abnormal HF Holdings Abnormal non-HF Holdings
Growth in Car Count -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.017 0.003 -0.008
(-0.351) (-1.036) (-0.305) (-0.702) (0.145) (-0.324)
Growth in Car Count × Release 0.057** 0.081** 0.059* 0.006 -0.005 -0.014
(2.037) (2.423) (1.882) (0.074) (-0.066) (-0.192)
Release 0.505 0.185 0.285 -0.422 -0.662 -0.215
(1.682) (0.682) (0.820) (-0.702) (-1.252) (-0.293)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
YQ FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 3,327 3,327 3,327 3,327 3,327 3,327
R-squared 0.028 0.108 0.124 0.026 0.132 0.147
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Alternative Data on Institutional Investor Profitability
This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of the following form:
Adjusted Stock Returnsi,t+1 = β1 ∗Abnormal Holdingsi,t + β2 ∗Release+ β3 ∗ (Abnormal Holdingsi,t ×Release) + β4 ∗Conti,t + εi,t
Conti,t is a vector of the following controls: prior quarter returns adjusted for the returns of the CRSP value-weighted index, book-to-
market, size, and turnover. All other variables are defined in previous tables. t-statistics, calculated using standard errors clustered by
firm and year-quarter, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Adjusted Stock Returns
Abnormal HF -0.001 -0.003** -0.002*
(-1.492) (-2.485) (-1.812)
Abnormal HF × Release 0.004* 0.006** 0.006**
(1.847) (2.034) (2.095)
Abnormal non-HF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.747) (-0.610) (-0.610)
Abnormal non-HF × Release 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.086) (0.470) (0.470)
Release 0.008 -0.064** 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
(0.577) (-2.217) (0.021) (0.552) (0.029) (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
YQ FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279
R-squared 0.202 0.078 0.252 0.201 0.251 0.251
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Table 2.6: Growth in Car Count and Individual Investor Order Demand
This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of the following form:
Individual OIBi,t = β1 ∗Growth in Car Counti,t + β2 ∗Release+ β3 ∗ (Growth in Car Counti,t ×Release) + β4 ∗ Conti,t + εi,t
Individual OIBi,t refers to either the volume or trade order imbalance for individual investors in stock i in month t. Conti,t is a vector
of the following controls: the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month, the log of book-to-market at the end of the prior
month, the stock return from month t− 12 to t− 2, and the log of stock turnover in the prior month. All other variables are defined in
previous tables. t-statistics, calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year-month, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Individual OIB Volume Individual OIB Trades
Growth in Car Count 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(2.840) (2.609) (2.899) (4.366) (3.411) (3.739)
Growth in Car Count x Release -0.056* -0.053 -0.064* -0.073** -0.064* -0.072**
(-1.741) (-1.456) (-1.786) (-2.195) (-1.953) (-2.207)
Release 0.002 0.010** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.4634) (2.579) (0.583) (0.585) (0.588) (0.164)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
YM FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 10,593 10,593 10,593 10,593 10,593 10,593
R-squared 0.031 0.035 0.055 0.054 0.065 0.097
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Alternative Data on Individual Investor Profitability
This table reports difference-in-differences regressions of the following form:
CARi,t,d to d+3 = β1 ∗Individual OIBi,t,d−3 to d−1+β2 ∗Release+ β3 ∗(Individual OIBi,t,d−3 to d−1×Release)+β4 ∗Conti,t+εi,t (2.9)
CARi,t,d to d+3 is the abnormal announcement return for stock i
′s earnings announcement for quarter t from the day of the announcement
until three days after. Individual OIBi,t,d−3 to d−1 is the individual order imbalance for either volume or trades for stock i for the three
days prior to the earnings announcement for quarter t. Conti,t is a vector of the following controls: the standardized unexpected earnings
for the quarter, prior quarter returns adjusted for the returns of the CRSP value-weighted index, book-to-market, size, and turnover.
All other variables are defined in previous tables. t-statistics, calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year-quarter, are
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Individual OIB Vol 0.007 0.004 0.002
(1.024) (0.613) (0.382)
Individual OIB Vol x Release -0.053** -0.047* -0.047*
(-2.105) (-1.725) (-1.662)
Individual OIB Trad 0.017* 0.010 0.008
(1.793) (1.024) (0.807)
Individual OIB Trad x Release -0.112** -0.115* -0.110*
(-2.282) (-1.959) (-1.847)
Release 0.009** 0.006 0.010* 0.011** 0.007* 0.012**
(2.170) (1.310) (1.920) (2.375) (1.849) (2.301)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
YQ FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,537
R-squared 0.023 0.078 0.089 0.024 0.080 0.090
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Table 2.8: The Effect of Alternative Data on Firm Liquidity
This table reports regressions of the following form:
Liquidityi,t = β1 ∗Release+ β2 ∗ Conti,t + εi,t
Liquidityi,t is measured using the log of the amihud illiquidity ratio and the bid-ask spread. Conti,t is a vector of the following controls:
the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month, the log of book-to-market at the end of the prior month, the stock return
from month t−12 to t−2, and the log of stock turnover in the prior month. All other variables are defined in previous tables. t-statistics,
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year-month, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Amihud) Bid-ask Spread
Release 0.004*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.005
(7.002) (2.524) (2.952) (11.657) (4.077) (1.268)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No No Yes No
YM FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 12,628 12,628 12,628 12,628 12,628 12,628
R-squared 0.380 0.835 0.385 0.445 0.835 0.459
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Figure 2.1: Sample Satellite Image
This figure shows an example of how satellite images of parking lots are converted into
car counts. This example is of a Wal-Mart store in Arizona. The circles identify each car.
Only cars inside the shaded region are counted towards Wal-Mart’s total car count. Source:
Orbital Insight.
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Figure 2.2: Daily Calendar Car Count
This figure shows the average parking lot car counts for each calendar day. Panel A reports
averages for all stocks in the sample, Panel B reports Wal-Mart’s car counts, and Panel C
reports Home Depot’s car counts.
Panel A: All Stocks
Panel B: Wal-Mart
Panel C: Home Depot
Figure 2.3: Growth in Car Count vs. Stock Return Example: Bed Bath and Beyond
This figure compares cumulative year-over-year growth in car traffic with cumulative stock
returns for Bed Bath and Beyond from 2011 to 2017. Car count data is from Orbital Insight
and stock return data is from CRSP.
Copyright c© Marcus Painter, 2019.
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Appendix A: Robustness checks for Chapter 1
This appendix tabulates the results of robustness checks mentioned in the dissertation.
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Table A1: Maturity: robustness
This table presents robustness checks for the regressions reported in Table 5. Panel A drops all observations for bonds that were issued in
Orleans Parish. Panel B also drops all observations for bonds issued in coastal counties that are not assigned a climate risk in Hallegatte
et al. (2013). The dependent variable is the total annualized issuance cost of a municipal bond. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by
county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: No New Orleans
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046 < 20 Years < 30 Years < 2036 < 2041 < 2046
Ln(Climate risk) 0.164 0.862** 0.208 0.707* 2.091** 0.011 0.064 0.058 0.077 0.078
(1.161) (2.583) (1.158) (1.646) (2.590) (0.085) (0.503) (0.457) (0.606) (0.613)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,155 6,659 25,281 8,484 2,092 204,421 243,832 225,273 242,019 248,381
R-squared 0.368 0.232 0.339 0.222 0.160 0.227 0.309 0.293 0.320 0.322
Panel B: No unobserved coastal
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046 < 20 Years < 30 Years < 2036 < 2041 < 2046
Ln(Climate risk) 0.110 0.849** 0.205 1.078** 3.028*** -0.055 -0.034 -0.039 -0.027 -0.031
(0.651) (2.230) (0.957) (2.289) (2.853) (-0.309) (-0.192) (-0.218) (-0.155) (-0.177)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,592 5,735 21,776 7,267 1,828 173,518 207,304 191,320 205,774 211,198
R-squared 0.348 0.219 0.314 0.208 0.146 0.200 0.277 0.262 0.287 0.289
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Table A.2: Maturity: yield and gross spread
This table presents results for yield and gross spread separately for the regressions reported in Table 5. Panel A shows results for the
long-term specifications. Panel B shows results for short-term specifications. Columns 1 through 5 report results for yield. Columns 6
through 10 report results for gross spread. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Long-term specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046 ≥ 20 Years ≥ 30 Years ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046
Dependent variable: Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Ln(Climate risk) 0.231** 0.457 0.205* 0.288 0.663*** 0.134* 0.203* 0.170* 0.178 0.217
(2.215) (1.632) (1.640) (1.316) (2.805) (1.785) (1.691) (1.878) (1.258) (0.799)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,248 9,108 31,107 9,998 2,458 52,623 9,430 29,285 9,954 2,599
R-squared 0.547 0.496 0.630 0.608 0.685 0.339 0.371 0.383 0.446 0.514
Panel B: Short-term specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Issue maturity: < 20 Years < 30 Years < 2036 < 2041 < 2046 < 20 Years < 30 Years < 2036 < 2041 < 2046
Dependent variable: Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Ln(Climate risk) 0.061 0.087 0.078 0.094 0.093 0.021 0.040 0.023 0.037 0.041
(0.754) (1.024) (0.969) (1.159) (1.149) (0.224) (0.449) (0.257) (0.420) (0.470)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253,876 309,946 287,994 309,040 316,559 206,242 249,357 229,563 248,841 256,166
R-squared 0.817 0.837 0.841 0.841 0.838 0.301 0.314 0.305 0.309 0.311
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Table A.3: Placebo tests: yield and gross spread
This table presents results for the regressions shown in Table 6 with yield and gross spread reported separately. Panel A shows results
for various long-term specifications for the geographic matching placebo tests. Panel B shows results for various long-term specifications
for the nearest neighbor matching placebo tests. The results for yield are reported in columns 1 through 6, and the results for gross
spread are reported in columns 7 through 12. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Geographic matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20Yr ≥ 25Yr ≥ 30Yr ≥2036 ≥2041 ≥2046 ≥ 20Yr ≥ 25Yr ≥ 30Yr ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046
Dependent var: Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Ln(Climate risk) 0.021 0.115 0.281 0.118 -0.015 -0.113 -0.044 -0.059 -0.047 -0.040 0.064 0.042
(0.188) (0.574) (0.843) (0.776) (-0.111) (-0.278) (-1.381) (-1.309) (-0.614) (-1.354) (0.406) (0.488)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,248 27,355 9,108 31,107 9,998 2,458 52,623 24,514 9,430 29,285 9,954 2,599
R-squared 0.553 0.503 0.479 0.630 0.595 0.667 0.358 0.368 0.400 0.403 0.358 0.545
Panel B: Nearest neighbor matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Issue maturity: ≥ 20Yr ≥ 25Yr ≥ 30Yr ≥2036 ≥2041 ≥2046 ≥ 20Yr ≥ 25Yr ≥ 30Yr ≥ 2036 ≥ 2041 ≥ 2046
Dependent var: Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Ln(Climate risk) -0.027 -0.048 -0.189 0.029 0.049 -0.326 -0.106 -0.191* -0.185** -0.181 -0.144 -0.004
(-0.422) (-0.476) (-1.153) (0.335) (0.381) (-1.322) (-1.628) (-1.768) (-2.478) (-1.595) (-1.438) (-0.036)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,248 27,355 9,108 31,107 9,998 2,458 52,623 24,514 9,430 33,246 9,954 2,599
R-squared 0.553 0.503 0.479 0.630 0.595 0.667 0.174 0.267 0.261 0.276 0.358 0.545
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Table A.4: Credit rating split: robustness
This table presents robustness checks for the regressions reported in Table 7. Panel A
drops all observations for bonds that were issued in Orleans Parish. Panel B also drops
all observations for bonds issued in coastal counties that are not assigned a climate risk in
Hallegatte et al. (2013). The dependent variable is the total annualized issuance cost of a
municipal bond. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: No New Orleans
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Rating: < AA- ≥ AA- < AA- ≥ AA-
Ln(Climate risk) 0.738 0.136 0.140 -0.007
(1.585) (0.594) (0.607) (-0.038)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,327 14,092 43,570 187,423
R-squared 0.609 0.238 0.090 0.724
Panel B: No unobserved coastal
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit rating: < AA- ≥ AA- < AA- ≥ AA-
Ln(Climate risk) 0.747* 0.189 0.352 -0.135
(1.937) (0.707) (1.230) (-0.591)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,583 12,078 37,185 159,107
R-squared 0.628 0.215 0.079 0.711
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Table A.5: Credit rating split: yield and gross spread
This table presents results for the regressions shown in Table 7 with yield and gross spread
reported separately. Panel A reports results for the credit rating splits with yield as the
dependent variable. Gross spread is the dependent variable in Panel B. t-statistics, based
on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Yield
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit rating: < AA- ≥ AA- < AA- ≥ AA-
Ln(Climate risk) 0.782*** 0.023 0.154 0.057
(2.700) (0.129) (1.505) (0.420)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,036 20,231 50,355 241,357
R-squared 0.551 0.520 0.809 0.846
Panel B: Gross spread
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit rating: < AA- ≥ AA- < AA- ≥ AA-
Ln(Climate risk) 0.188* 0.116 -0.075 0.132
(1.762) (1.288) (-1.003) (1.183)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,927 17,508 54,426 189,702
R-squared 0.461 0.349 0.365 0.306
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Table A.6: Difference-in-differences of annualized issuance costs around the Stern Review: robustness
This table presents robustness checks for the regressions reported in Table 8. Panel A drops all observations for bonds that were issued in
Orleans Parish. Panel B also drops all observations for bonds issued in coastal counties that are not assigned a climate risk in Hallegatte
et al. (2013). t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: No New Orleans
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time frame: Full sample Two years One year Full sample Two years One year
Ln(Climate risk) -0.090 -0.202 -0.093 -0.313 -0.031 -0.064
(-0.344) (-1.022) (-0.332) (-1.000) (-0.190) (-0.243)
Ln(Climate risk) x Stern 0.663** 0.596* 0.285 0.360 -0.008 -0.138
(2.081) (1.938) (0.814) (1.118) (-0.048) (-0.487)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,546 4,998 2,404 231,045 8,577 4,142
R-squared 0.297 0.220 0.248 0.284 0.124 0.156
Panel B: No unobserved coastal
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time frame: Full sample Two years One year Full sample One year Two years
Ln(Climate risk) -0.244 -0.289 -0.267 -0.612 -0.187 -0.128
(-0.897) (-1.287) (-0.997) (-1.413) (-0.491) (-0.533)
Ln(Climate risk) x Stern 0.815** 0.536* 0.316 0.577 0.084 0.080
(2.097) (1.823) (0.887) (1.321) (0.264) (0.392)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,783 4,233 2,031 196,344 3,505 7,281
R-squared 0.276 0.229 0.260 0.252 0.156 0.127
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Table A.7: Difference-in-differences of yield and gross spread around the Stern Review
This table presents results for the regressions shown in Table 8 with yield and gross spread reported separately. Yield is the dependent
variable in Panel A. Gross spread is the dependent variable in Panel B. t-statistics, based on errors clustered by county, are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Yield
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time frame: Full sample Two years One year Full sample Two years One year
Ln(Climate risk) 0.078 -0.222 -0.179 0.001 0.298 -0.053
(0.630) (-1.640) (-1.108) (0.003) (0.686) (-0.211)
Ln(Climate risk) x Stern 0.293* 0.754** 0.326 0.087 -0.189 -0.159
(1.698) (2.424) (1.084) (0.346) (-0.536) (-0.575)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,379 7,033 2,406 291,750 12,795 4,142
R-squared 0.512 0.168 0.266 0.835 0.107 0.155
Panel B: Gross spread
Long-term Short-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time frame: Full sample Two years One year Full sample One year Two years
Ln(Climate risk) -0.002 -0.025 -0.152 -0.088 0.010 0.000
(-0.019) (-0.196) (-1.274) (-0.812) (0.097) (0.001)
Ln(Climate risk) x Stern 0.224** 0.269 0.289* 0.128 0.205 0.217
(2.074) (1.404) (1.865) (0.884) (0.915) (0.550)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,542 5,659 3,388 231,295 9,727 4,142
R-squared 0.348 0.231 0.282 0.313 0.294 0.295
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Appendix B: Predicting Firm Fundamentals with Satellite Data
I follow the literature to develop measures for cash flow surprises. I follow Jegadeesh and
Livnat (2006) and Froot, Kang, Ozik, and Sadka (2017) to construct the standardized
unexpected revenue (SUR), which assumes revenue follows a seasonal random walk with a
drift. Specifically, SUR for firm i in quarter q is defined using the following equation:
SURi,q =
(Revi,q −Revi,q−4) − ri,q
σi,q
, (10)
where ri,q and σi,q are the average and standard deviation, respectively, of
(Revi,q −Revi,q−4) for the prior eight quarters. The second measure I use for cash flow is
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), defined for firm i in quarter q as follows:
SUEi,q =
A(EPSi,q) − F (EPSi,q)
Pi,q
, (11)
where A(EPSi,q) is the actual earnings per share on the announcement date, F (EPSi,q)
is the average analyst forecasted earnings per share, and Pi,q is the stock price at the end
of the quarter. Finally, I calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the earnings
announcement as the stock return in excess over the market from one day before the
earnings announcement date until three days after the announcement date. Because
earnings are often reported after trading hours (Berkman and Truong, 2009), I use a five
day window announcement in order to ensure that the market’s complete reaction to
earnings is measured. Results are robust to using a three day or four day window.
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Table A.8: Firm Fundamentals and Announcement Returns
This table presents regressions of SUE, SUR, and CAR on growth in car count as
well as control variables. Growth in Car CountQ is calculated as the log of average
car count in the current quarter minus the log of average car count over the prior
four quarters. SUR is calculated as [(Revi,t − Revi,t−4) − ri,t]/σi,t where ri,t and σi,t
are the average and standard deviation, respectively, of (Revi,t − Revi,t−4) over the
prior eight quarters and Revi,t is the revenue for stock i in quarter t. The control
variables are the log of market equity in t-1, the log of book-to-market in t-1, the
cumulative stock return from 30 days to 3 days before the earnings announcement
date, and the log of turnover over the prior 12 months, and the standard deviation
of analysts’ EPS forecasts. t-statistics, calculated using standard errors clustered by
firm and year-quarter, are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3)
SUR SUE CAR
Growth in Car Count 1.793*** 0.021** 0.088***
(4.814) (2.228) (3.515)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
YQ FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,419 3,426 3,424
R-squared 0.153 0.217 0.094
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